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ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
STATES, IOS, AND COURTS AS 
SHAMING REFERENCE GROUPS 
Professor Sandeep Gopalan* and Dr. Roslyn Fuller† 
INTRODUCTION 
oes international law (“IL”) impose meaningful con-
straints on state behavior? Unabated drone strikes by 
the dominant superpower in foreign territories, an ineffective 
United Nations (“U.N.”), and persistent disregard for interna-
tional law obligations—e.g., the continued killing of citizens by 
states with an obligation to protect1—all suggest that the skep-
tics have won the debate about whether international law is 
law in the sense in which the term is commonly understood and 
whether it affects state behavior.2 This Article argues that such 
a conclusion would be in error because it grossly underesti-
mates the complex ways in which IL affects state behavior. The 
scholars who claim that the lack of coercive power in IL de-
prives it of the attributes necessary for it to have the force of 
law err in imagining that the types of physical coercion typical-
ly used in domestic law enforcement are the only types of coer-
cion available for the enforcement of legal rules.3 
Incarceration is not the only type of coercion available for law 
enforcement. Granted, depriving the offender of his liberty by 
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1. Syria Chemical Weapons Attack Killed 1,429, Says John Kerry, BBC NEWS 
(Aug. 30, 2013), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-23906913. 
 2. See generally JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC POSNER, THE LIMITS OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 3–17 (2005) (applying “rational choice theory” to argue 
that IL is law). 
 3. See, e.g., Anthony D’Amato, Is International Law Really “Law”?, 79 
NW. U.L. REV 1293, 1293 (1985). 
D 
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confining him in jail has severe expressive, deterrent, retribu-
tive, and incapacitative effects, but other punishments can 
achieve the same purposes and be just as coercive. If these al-
ternative punishments can be shown to achieve the aforemen-
tioned effects, the central argument against IL being law in the 
strict conventional sense fails. This Article aims to do this by 
focusing on a relatively neglected kind of sanction in IL—
shaming. 4  The authors show that IL is enforced by states, 
courts, and international organizations by the imposition of 
shame sanctions on offenders and that these sanctions affect 
state behavior in the same ways that traditional coercive sanc-
tions do. 
The emphasis on shaming is not new to legal scholarship: 
criminal law scholars, among others, have produced a rich vein 
of literature on shame sanctions.5 In contrast, IL scholars have 
largely passed over the concept, although some have suggested 
that shaming may have a positive role in ensuring compliance 
with international law.6 This is surprising since shaming is 
                                                                                                             
 4. See Lesley Wexler, The International Deployment of Shame, Second-
Best Responses, and Norm Entrepreneurship: The Campaign to Ban 
Landmines and the Landmine Treaty, 20 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 561, 565–
66 (2003). 
 5. See Dan Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 591 (1996) [hereinafter Alternative Sanctions]; Toni M. Massaro, Shame, 
Culture, and American Criminal Law, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1880, 1883 (1991) 
[hereinafter Massaro, Shame and Criminal Law] (analyzing whether “the 
assumed link between people’s sense of shame and their tendency to observe 
legal norms . . . is one that American criminal court judges can, or should, 
exploit”); James Q. Whitman, What Is Wrong with Inflicting Shame Sanc-
tions?, 107 YALE L.J. 1055, 1058–59 (1998); see generally Dan M. Kahan & 
Eric A. Posner, Shaming White-Collar Criminals: A Proposal for Reform of 
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 J.L. & ECON. 365 (1999) (discussing the 
benefits shaming provides to the deterrence of white-collar crime). 
 6. See Louis Henkin, Human Rights: Ideology and Aspiration, Reality 
and Prospect, in REALIZING HUMAN RIGHTS: MOVING FROM INSPIRATION TO 
IMPACT 1, 24–25 (Samantha Powers & Graham Allison eds., 2000). 
The various influences that induce compliance with human rights 
norms are cumulative, and some of them add up to an underappreci-
ated means of enforcing human rights, which has been characterized 
as “mobilizing shame.” Intergovernmental as well as governmental 
policies and actions combine with those of NGOs and the public me-
dia, and in many countries also public opinion, to mobilize and max-
imize public shame. 
Id. at 24. 
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pervasive in IL and matches up well with the cost-benefit type 
of prerequisites typically employed in the design of sanctions 
and incentives.7 Moreover, both the impossibility of establish-
ing a centralized system of traditional law enforcement meth-
ods for IL in the foreseeable future and the moral roots of many 
IL norms ought to make the study of shaming worthwhile. 
Shaming, as it is used in this Article, refers to a deliberate 
attempt to negatively impact a state, regime, or leader’s repu-
tation by publicizing and targeting violations of international 
law norms.8  Psychology literature contains rich material on 
shame, particularly as it relates to similar emotions such as 
guilt and embarrassment. For instance, Tangney and Miller 
write that “[w]hen experiencing shame, people felt physically 
smaller and more inferior to others; they felt they had less con-
trol over the situation. Shame experiences were more likely to 
involve a sense of exposure (feeling observed by others) and a 
concern with others’ opinions of the event.”9 In experimental 
settings, shame was seen to be an intense, painful emotion in-
volving feelings of “moral transgression,” responsibility, and 
regret.10 In other words, shaming can produce effects similar to 
other kinds of coercion. 
IL actors have employed shaming to achieve coercive out-
comes. Some of these shaming methods include labeling a state 
as an offender, creating a reputation as a bad actor and non-
cooperator, marginalizing or expelling the state from interna-
tional organizations, causing economic damage, shunning by 
other states, and mobilizing domestic public opinion against 
the offending regime or leader.11 Coercion is employed against 
                                                                                                             
 7. Wexler, supra note 4, at 564 (“[o]ne advantage of shaming penalties, as 
compared to incarceration, is their cheapness”). 
 8. See Chad Flanders, Shame and the Meanings of Punishment, 54 CLEV. 
ST. L. REV. 609, 610 (2006) (“most scholars agree that shaming punishments 
involve the deliberate public humiliation of the offender[]”). 
 9. June Price Tangney et al., Are Shame, Guilt, and Embarrassment Dis-
tinct Emotions?, 70 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSY. 1256, 1257 (1996). 
 10. Id. 
 11. See generally Katherine Butler, Pakistan Told to Reform or Face Isola-
tion, INDEPENDENT (Oct. 19, 1999), 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/pakistan-told-to-reform-or-
face-isolation-739976.html (discussing how Pakistan was removed from the 
U.K. Commonwealth following a military coup); Richard Dowden, Blair Fails 
to Reach Commonwealth Agreement on Zimbabwe Exclusion, INDEPENDENT 
(Dec. 6, 2003), available at 
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offenders with the objective of obtaining norm-conforming be-
havior in the future, and as a signaling device for other observ-
ers to show that breaching IL norms can be costly. 
Criminal law scholarship shows that shame sanctions are 
most effective in tightly knit societies with shared norms.12 If 
the ideal condition—a normative framework that is precise in 
terms of obligations and enforcement—is indicative of prereq-
uisite criteria, the landscape for the enforcement of interna-
tional law norms reveals a high degree of heterogeneity 
amongst nation states in terms of both normative frameworks 
and enforcement models. This suggests that shaming is unlike-
ly to be effective. However, this facile conclusion is undermined 
by conditions that make shaming powerful despite the lack of 
precision in obligation and enforcement: complex webs of net-
worked linkages between states that create co-dependent rela-
tionships akin to tight-knit local communities. Buttressing 
these co-dependent links between nation states are the shared 
epistemic, religious,13 ethnic, gender,14 economic, and language 
                                                                                                             
http://search.proquest.com/docview/309612457/140EA768F6D1AFE2FA1/1?ac
countid=37371 (arguing that Prime Minister Blair was unable to convince 
other leaders to extend Zimbabwe’s suspension from the Commonwealth due 
to a skewed portrayal of the Zimbabwe issue). 
 12. David Skeel, Shaming in Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1811, 1811 
(2001). 
 13. See Jeff Haynes, Transnational Religious Actors and International 
Politics, 22 THIRD WORLD Q. 143, 143–58 (2001). Co-religionists have acted 
beyond national borders on numerous occasions: 
Pope Benedict has condemned the violence against Christians in 
Orissa but also deplored the killing of the [Laxmananda]. On [Au-
gust 28th], Italy’s Foreign Ministry said it will summon India’s am-
bassador to demand “incisive action” to prevent further attacks 
against Christians. A statement issued after a cabinet meeting also 
said Italy would ask France, the current EU president, to take up 
the issue at a future meeting of foreign ministers. 
See, e.g., PM Terms Orissa Violence a National Shame, CNN-IBN (Sept. 2, 
2008), http://ibnlive.in.com/news/pm-terms-orissa-violence-a-national-
shame/72406-3.html. 
 14. The women’s movement transcends national boundaries in its cam-
paigns for issues affecting women around the world. The U.N. Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women is one mani-
festation of a legal framework for this community. U.N. Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, opened for signa-
ture Mar. 1, 1980, 1249 U.N.T.S 13. See generally MYRA MARX FERREE ET AL., 
GLOBAL FEMINISM: TRANSNATIONAL WOMEN’S ACTIVISM, ORGANIZING, AND 
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bonds. Together, these forces result in shared commitments to 
many IL norms despite deep divergences in domestic laws.15 
For example, all participants in the international law system 
support, at a minimum, the condemnation of torture,16 slav-
ery,17 piracy,18 genocide,19 prostitution,20 and narcotic drugs.21 
Extracting from ratification records for IL instruments, state 
                                                                                                             
HUMAN RIGHTS (2006) (demonstrating how feminism has increasingly used 
the transnational arena to articulate their demands); VALENTINE M. 
MOGHADAM, GLOBALIZING WOMEN: TRANSNATIONAL FEMINIST NETWORKS (2005) 
(arguing that “transnational feminist networks are the organizational ex-
pression of the transnational women’s movement and are guided by . . . global 
feminism”); TRANSNATIONAL SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND GLOBAL POLITICS: 
SOLIDARITY BEYOND THE STATE (Jackie Smith et al. eds., 1997) (discussing 
how nations demonstrate their commitment to international law norms that 
may differ from domestic policy). 
 15. Peter M. Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities and Internation-
al Policy Coordination, 46 INT’L ORG. 1, 3 (defining an epistemic community 
as a “network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a 
particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge 
within that domain or issue-area”). 
 16. See Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrad-
ing Treatment or Punishment, opened for signature Feb. 4, 1985, 112 Stat. 
2681, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85. 
 17. See Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave 
Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, opened for signature 
Sept. 7, 1956, 18 U.S.T. 3201, 266 U.N.T.S. 3; Universal Declaration of Hu-
man Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III), art. 4 (Dec. 10, 
1948); U.N. Charter art. 55; Slavery Convention, opened for signature Sept. 
25, 1926, 60 L.N.T.S. 254. 
 18. See U.N. Convention on the High Seas arts. 14–22, opened for signa-
ture Apr. 29, 1958, 2 U.S.T. 2312, 450 U.N.T.S. 11. 
 19. See U.N. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide art. 1, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277. 
 20. See U.N. Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and 
of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others arts. 1–4, opened for signa-
ture Mar. 21, 1950, 96 U.N.T.S. 271. 
 21. See U.N. Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psy-
chotropic Substances art. 2, opened for signature Dec. 20, 1988, 1582 U.N.T.S. 
95; Protocol Amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, opened for 
signature Mar. 25, 1972, 976 U.N.T.S. 3; U.N. Convention on Psychotropic 
Substances, opened for signature Feb. 21, 1971, 32 U.S.T. 543, 1019 U.N.T.S. 
175; U.N. Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, opened for signature Mar. 30, 
1961, 18 U.S.T. 1407, 520 U.N.T.S. 151; Second International Opium Conven-
tion, Feb. 19, 1925, 81 L.N.T.S. 317; Agreement Concerning the Suppression 
of the Manufacture of, International Trade in, and Use of, Prepared Opium, 
Feb. 11, 1925, 51 L.N.T.S. 337; International Opium Convention, Jan. 23, 
1912, 8 L.N.T.S. 187. 
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practice, and publicly articulated commitments, it is possible to 
compose a shared normative framework for the international 
community.22 It has been claimed that this community is one of 
“civilized nations,” suggesting a moral element to the impetus 
for cooperation.23 Even formalized manifestations of this com-
munity, such as the U.N., support this idea.24 
Apart from communities of nation states, regimes and their 
leaders are also part of several networks, whether they are in-
ternational organizations such as the U.N., regional organiza-
tions such as the European Union, or clubs of allied regimes 
such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and De-
velopment (“OECD”) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(“NATO”). When a state or leader is a member of a community 
or network characterized by interdependence, other members 
are able to direct evaluative opinions about them, which may 
be esteem enhancing or detracting. Such communities will be 
referred to as shaming reference groups. As rational actors, 
states and their leaders will behave in ways calculated to max-
imize esteem and minimize shame with reference to the appli-
cable normative framework by supporting norms, adhering to 
them, reacting against breaches, championing new norms, etc. 
Whether the actor accepts a norm or not, at a minimum the 
reference group’s imposition of a shame sanction can make the 
commission of the offending act costly to the actor. Even if the 
state or regime is impervious to shame and not amenable to 
norm-conforming behavior in the future, the very process of 
shaming has the effect of establishing and cementing the as-
serted norm for non-offenders—not a trivial function in IL be-
cause it is a discipline where norms are created in a dynamic 
non-linear structure and are constantly evolving.25 
                                                                                                             
 22. See Bardo Fassbender, The United Nations Charter as Constitution of 
the International Community, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 529, 535, 542 
(1998). 
 23. See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, para. 1(c), 
June 26, 1945, 33 U.N.T.S. 993. 
 24. See, e.g., Press Release, Kofi Annan, U.N. Sec’y Gen., The Meaning of 
International Community, U.N. Press Release UNIS/SG/2478 (Dec. 30, 1999). 
 25. Professor Kahan argues that shaming has the effect of shaping prefer-
ences. If individuals are shamed for contravening a particular asserted norm, 
other observers will modify their own behavior to fit that asserted norm. Al-
ternative Sanctions, supra note 5, at 639. 
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Although states are the principal IL actors, shaming is also 
attractive at the level of individual actors who are mainly 
agents of states: leaders of nation states, the primary compo-
nent of this category, tend to belong to those sections of society 
most sensitive to reputational damage. For example, if the 
state is a democracy, political leaders have to prioritize voter 
reactions to their behavior, and reputational damage at the in-
ternational level might be leveraged by opponents in electoral 
contests. Even in non-democratic states, leaders have to bal-
ance various constituencies and power groups to retain their 
own power. Thus, shame external to the state has the potential 
to disrupt the balance of power in a non-democratic state and 
strengthen the non-democratic leader’s internal opponents. 
Shaming also has functional consequences for a leader: his 
reputation affects his ability to enter into business transactions 
and attract foreign investment—essential measures of success-
ful governance in the global economy. In addition, evidence 
suggests that leaders from democratic and non-democratic 
states are eager to join multilateral organizations and gain po-
sitions in them to buttress their domestic standing.26 For all of 
these reasons, shame sanctions have constraining power for 
leaders of nation states at the individual level. 
Part I of this Article shows how the conceptual work on 
shaming is applicable to IL. Part II develops a structure for 
shaming in IL by identifying the relevant targets for shaming, 
the enforcers of the sanction, and the conditions for imposing 
the sanction. Part II further analyzes several examples of 
states, regimes, and individuals being shamed by international 
organizations and by domestic courts in the United Kingdom 
(“U.K.”), the United States, Germany, and Canada. It further 
illustrates that enforcement of IL norms via shaming affects 
state behavior in ways similar to traditional coercive sanctions. 
Part III develops the notion of a shaming reference group, ad-
vancing some examples of networks that meet the necessary 
conditions, including supranational organizations such as the 
EU, and networks of domestic courts. The Article then con-
cludes. 
                                                                                                             
 26. See, e.g., Ingmar Oldberg, Russia’s Great Power Strategy under Putin 
and Medvedev, 1 UI OCCASIONAL PAPER 1, 4–10 (2010); WTO Entry for Beijing 
Is Priority: EU Pushes for Talks on China Trade Status, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 9, 
1996), http://www.nytimes.com/1996/12/09/business/worldbusiness/09iht-
wto.t_6.html. 
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I. TRANSPLANTING SHAMING INTO INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Criminal law scholars have engaged in extensive analysis of 
shaming sanctions. At the definitional level, “[s]haming is the 
process by which citizens publicly and self-consciously draw 
attention to the bad dispositions or actions of an offender, as a 
way of punishing him for having those dispositions or engaging 
in those actions.”27 Scholars offer examples ranging from the 
media releasing the names of men who solicit prostitutes,28 to 
the special license plates required for people convicted of driv-
ing under the influence of alcohol.29 In addition, courts occa-
sionally shame offenders as part of the sentencing process.30 
                                                                                                             
 27. Kahan & Posner, supra note 5, at 368. 
 28. Stephen P. Garvey, Can Shaming Punishments Educate?, 65 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 733, 735 & n.12 (1998); Courtney Guyton Persons, Sex in the Sunlight: 
The Effectiveness, Efficiency, Constitutionality, and Advisability of Publishing 
Names and Pictures of Prostitutes’ Patrons, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1525, 1536–37 
(1998). 
 29. Donna DiGiovanni, Comment, The Bumper Sticker: The Innovation 
That Failed, 22 NEW ENG. L. REV. 643, 644 (1988) (citing Goldschmitt v. 
State, 490 So. 2d 123 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986)). 
 30. See, e.g., United States v. Gementera, 379 F.3d 596, 598, 607 (9th Cir. 
2004) (holding that the requirement that a convict wear a signboard pro-
claiming his guilt was “reasonably related to the legitimate statutory objec-
tive of rehabilitation”); United States v. Coenen, 135 F.3d 938, 939, 946 (5th 
Cir. 1998) (requiring a person convicted of transmission of child pornography 
to publish notice in the official journal of the parish was within the district 
court’s broad discretion to protect); United States v. Schechter, 13 F.3d 1117, 
1118–19 (7th Cir. 1994) (requiring the defendant to notify all future employ-
ers of the defendant’s past tax offenses was not an abuse of its broad discre-
tion to protect the public); People v. McDowell, 130 Cal. Rptr 839, 842–43 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1976) (requiring that purse thief who used tennis shoes to ap-
proach his victims quietly and flee swiftly wear tap shoes “should foster re-
habilitation and promote the public safety”); Goldschmitt v. Florida, 490 So. 
2d 123, 124–26 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (requiring a defendant to place a 
sticker that read “CONVICTED D.U.I.—RESTRICTED LICENSE” is not 
“sufficiently humiliating to trigger constitutional objections”); Ballenger v. 
Georgia, 436 S.E.2d 793, 794–95 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993) (court refused to inter-
fere with trial court’s broad discretion in imposing a condition requiring the 
offender “to wear a fluorescent pink plastic bracelet imprinted with the words 
‘D.U.I. CONVICT’”). Contra People v. Hackler, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 681, 686–87 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (striking down on appeal a requirement that a shoplift-
ing offender wear a t-shirt whenever he left the house that read on the front, 
“My record plus two six-packs equals four years” and on the back, “I am on 
felony probation for theft,” on the ground that the objective was to “public[ly] 
ridicule and humiliat[e], rather than to foster rehabilitation”); People v. 
Johnson, 528 N.E.2d 1360, 1361–62 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (requiring a DWI of-
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For criminal law scholars, shaming is the means by which 
negative emotions aroused by the offender are expressed. 31 
This is often done by an agent acting presumptively to enforce 
the shaming sanction on behalf of a group.32 Deterrence is cen-
tral to such shaming because it is calculated to show other 
members of the community that offending can be costly.33 Giv-
en the absence of a fair process or prior community consent, 
some enforcers might be overly aggressive in shaming offend-
ers and thereby deter too much. Consequently, individuals 
might forsake otherwise valid conduct for fear of being target-
ed. For example, fear of religious fanatics who both assert the 
need for particular clothing as an article of religious belief and 
police those who do not comply might coerce women into wear-
ing religious garments like the burka even in secular countries. 
Proponents of shaming in criminal law do not claim that 
shaming is purely deterrence-based. For them, it also serves 
the retributive function of punishment.34 Aside from meeting 
these objectives of punishment, shaming is more cost-effective 
because the burden is delegated to the community, making ex-
penditures for the establishment of an administrative structure 
                                                                                                             
fender to publish a newspaper advertisement with an apology and his mug 
shot was struck down because the effect of the condition was to “possibly . . . 
add[] public ridicule as a condition” and could be contrary to the goal of reha-
bilitation); People v. Letterlough, 655 N.E.2d 146, 147, 151 (N.Y. 1995) 
(“CONVICTED DWI” sign on license plate not permitted because it could not 
“under any view be regarded as a rehabilitative measure”). 
 31. See Skeel, supra note 12, at 1814–16. 
 32. See id. (arguing that when judges administer shaming sanctions, they 
often reflect the emotions of the affected group). 
 33.  
[N]otification results in shaming the offender, thereby effecting some 
amount of retribution. This suffering “serves as a threat of negative 
repercussions [thereby] discourag[ing] people from engaging in cer-
tain behavior.” It is, therefore, also a deterrent. There is no disputing 
this deterrent signal; the notification provisions are triggered by be-
havior that is already a crime, suggesting that those who consider 
engaging in such behavior should beware. 
E.B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077, 1120–21 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing Artway v. At-
torney General, 81 F.3d 1235, 1243 (3d Cir. 1996)). See also Gementera, 379 
F.3d at 601–03 (2004). 
 34. Flanders, supra note 8, at 612. See also Alternative Sanctions, supra 
note 5, at 631, 637. 
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unnecessary.35 Shaming also provides bite to other sanctions. 
For example, a fine alone may not be effective if the offender is 
able to pay it without suffering any material infringement of 
the lifestyle to which he is accustomed. However, when the 
stigma added by shame in addition to having incurred the fine 
is considered, such a sanction may be considerably more effec-
tive than is apparent at first glance.36 
Critics argue that shaming has debilitating negative effects.37 
They claim that offenders might form subcommunities that ex-
plicitly embrace the offender’s wrongs and defy the majority’s 
norms.38 Criminal activity is celebrated in such subcommuni-
ties and shaming has no effect on behavior.39 Gangs and terror-
ist organizations are examples of such subcommunities.40 Some 
scholars also claim that individual offenders may be treated 
differently because of the intervention of extraneous factors.  
Similarly, states are sometimes treated differently for the vi-
olation of the same IL norm. For example, India and Pakistan 
were treated more charitably than North Korea after testing 
nuclear weapons.41 These two states had greater geopolitical 
clout and were therefore not punished harshly for these ac-
                                                                                                             
 35. See Alternative Sanctions, supra note 5, at 641. 
 36. Id at 630–49. This problem persists in most areas where fines are the 
standard punishment. For example, a fine would have been a rather weak 
sanction when applied to Martha Stewart because of her vast financial re-
sources, whereas shaming can strike at a commodity that might not be so 
easily replaceable—her reputation. 
 37. See Garvey, supra note 28, at 746–62; Massaro, Shame and Criminal 
Law, supra note 5, at 1944; MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY: 
DISGUST, SHAME, AND THE LAW 337 (2004). See generally Toni M. Massaro, The 
Meanings of Shame, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 645 (1997) (arguing that the 
use of shaming in the wrong context can be ruinous). 
 38. Braithwaite writes that a possible result of extending shaming is that 
“[offenders may] associate with others who are perceived in some limited or 
total way as also at odds with mainstream standards.” JOHN BRAITHWAITE, 
CRIME, SHAME AND REINTEGRATION 67 (1989). 
 39. Alternative Sanctions, supra note 5. 
 40. See BRAITHWAITE, supra note 38, at 65–66 (discussing the prevalence of 
criminal gangs, motorcycle gangs, “and other groups which transmit criminal 
subcultures”). 
 41. See Uttara Choudhury, Seven Years after Going Nuclear, India and 
Pakistan Thriving, DEFENCETALK (June 2, 2005), 
http://www.defencetalk.com/seven-years-after-going-nuclear-india-and-
pakistan-thriving-3001/ (“Based on the experiences of India and Pakistan 
since they tested nuclear weapons in 1998, North Korea could be forgiven for 
thinking the price of carrying out an atomic test is worth paying.”). 
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tions, whereas states such as North Korea and Iran continue to 
be treated harshly. 42  Inequality and disproportionality are 
problems that bedevil even traditional sanctions and therefore 
are not fatal objections to shaming. 
Other critics of shame sanctions claim that the purported 
costs and benefits of shaming are not as significant as propo-
nents make them out to be.43 These critics refer to the cost of 
establishing reputations and maintaining them, as well as the 
dissipation of these expenditures when reputations are tar-
nished without visible gain.44 Further, shaming entails its own 
cost—the cost of engaging in the conduct embodying moral dis-
approval, whether it is the foregoing of otherwise profitable in-
teractions, or the cost of conveying the disapproval in another 
manner.45 For example, if the United States and other nations 
desired to shame China for human rights violations (e.g. the 
suppression of Falun Gong)46 and chose to stop importing cheap 
commodities from that country, consumers would have to pay 
higher prices, existing business relationships would be disrupt-
ed, rogue companies that chose to defy the sanctions would 
have to be policed, countries that had not participated in the 
shaming would engage in opportunistic behavior, and so on, 
making the shaming costly to the enforcers.47 
As previously noted, shaming works best in tight-knit com-
munities and some critics have thus argued that diverse com-
munities do not offer conditions conducive to effective shaming 
because of the lack of social interdependence;48 social heteroge-
neity creates problems of definition pertaining to the kinds of 
offenses that might engender a feeling of shame.49 Moreover, 
the scale of large communities necessarily results in a large 
                                                                                                             
 42. See Bill Nicholas, Condemnation Swift, but Options Are Limited, USA 
TODAY (Oct. 9, 2006), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/2006-10-09-
nuke-test-reaction_x.htm. 
 43. Kahan & Posner, supra note 5, at 372. 
 44. See Massaro, Shame and Criminal Law, supra note 5, at 1938. 
 45. See Skeel, supra note 12, at 1814–20. 
 46. For relevant background information, see THOMAS LUM, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., RL 33437, CHINA AND FALUN GONG (2006). 
 47. See generally Skeel, supra note 12 (providing a similar example in the 
corporate law context). 
 48. See Massaro, Shame and Criminal Law, supra note 5, at 1916. 
 49. Id. at 1923. Thus, even if a particular community could theoretically 
impose shame on an offender, a given judge’s particular method of accom-
plishing that goal may still be off the mark. 
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volume of communications about shaming, creating an “over-
load.”50 The volume problem is an even larger one in IL due to 
the number of actors and their potential interactions, but this 
need not be overstated if the relevant community is the sham-
ing reference group. This group would be discrete enough for 
communication costs to be sufficiently low and for offenses to 
be observable. 
In addition, and in contrast to the individual level interac-
tions relevant in domestic criminal law, nation states are ex-
tremely interdependent. Commercial and trade linkages are so 
strong that no state can afford to ignore other states without a 
cost. This price might take the form of, inter alia, lost develop-
mental aid and grants,51 withdrawal of foreign direct invest-
ment,52 the flight of foreign institutional investors from the 
state’s stock markets (causing security prices to fall),53 the de-
cline and possible collapse of a state’s currency,54 the embargo 
of contracts with companies based in the offending state (caus-
ing the companies to lose out on profitable transactions 
abroad), 55  restrictions on the repatriation of capital to that 
state,56 restrictions on travel to and from that state,57 and the 
                                                                                                             
 50. Id. at 1930. 
 51. See Rich Nielsen, Rewarding Human Rights? Selective Aid Sanctions 
Against Repressive States, INT’L. STUD. Q. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 
2–3). Nielsen’s study found that aid donors withdraw aid when repressive 
acts are publicized in the media. Id. at 9. 
 52. See Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, Trading Human Rights: How Preferen-
tial Trade Agreements Influence Government Repression, 59 I’NTL. ORG. 593, 
609–14 (2005). 
 53. See Not Open for Business: Despite Elections, Investor Risk Remains 
High in Burma, CONFLICT RISK NETWORK 5 n.22 (Apr. 2012), 
http://endgenocide.org/images/uploads/downloads/burma-not-open-for-
business.pdf. 
 54. See Iran Arrests 50 over Currency Decline, YAHOO! NEWS (Oct. 24, 
2012), available at http://news.yahoo.com/iran-arrests-50-over-currency-
decline-122538312—finance.html. 
 55. See Curt Anderson, Judge Blocks Fla. Cuba, Syria Business Ties Law, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 25, 2012, http://bigstory.ap.org/article/judge-blocks-
fla-cuba-syria-business-ties-law. 
 56. U.S. Government Eases Sanctions Against Burma, SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP 
(July 12, 2012), http://www.sidley.com/US-Government-Eases-Sanctions-
Against-Burma-07-12-2012/. See Council Decision 2012/635/CFSP, art. 4, 
2012 O.J. (L 282/58). 
 57. See, e.g., Press Release, Council of the European Union, Human Rights 
Violations: Council Tightens Sanctions Against Iran (Mar. 23, 2012), 
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suspension and expulsion of that state from international and 
regional organizations.58 
The heterogeneity objection has some teeth for a different 
reason—in a heterogeneous society it is difficult to define what 
behaviors attract shame sanctions. There are differences be-
tween nation states in regards to conduct that can be the sub-
ject of shame due to variations in national legal systems, nor-
mative structures, cultures, and moral ideas. The effect of 
these variations may be somewhat mitigated because, notwith-
standing differences between domestic audiences about wheth-
er a state’s conduct is shameful, as long as the state has to en-
gage with another state where it is so viewed, shaming will 
have a constraining effect. Thus, even though the citizens of 
the offending state and its leader do not regard the conduct as 
shameful, the very process of interaction with others who do, 
and express blame for such conduct, means that the state must 
experience some shame. A rational state might determine that 
such conduct has low utility and cease to engage in it. An ex-
ample of such behavior is Libya’s response to the Pan-Am dis-
pute found in Part II of this Article. 
Other scholars have developed critiques focusing on the lack 
of procedural fairness in the deployment of shame sanctions.59 
Predicated on a well-developed strain of constitutional juris-
prudence establishing basic fairness protections for offenders,60 
these critics claim that shaming fails the test of fairness. The 
critics’ argument falls into four parts: the enforcers are not 
neutral judges charged with legal obligations to ensure that the 
offender is considered innocent until proven guilty, the offender 
is not afforded an opportunity to defend himself adequately, 
there is no protection against coercion, and there is no guaran-
                                                                                                             
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/12
9215.pdf. 
 58. See Tom Baird, The Positive and Punitive Power of CMAG, 
COMMONWEALTH Q. (Mar. 7, 2008), 
http://secretariat.thecommonwealth.org/EZInformation/176155/060308cmag/; 
Organization of Islamic Cooperation Suspends Syria’s Membership, AL 
ARABIYA (Aug. 13 2012), 
http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/08/13/232088.html. 
 59. Seth Kreimer, Sunlight, Secrets, and Scarlet Letters: The Tension Be-
tween Privacy and Disclosure in Constitutional Law, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 5–
12 (1991). 
 60. See, e.g., id. at 93 & n.251. 
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tee that precedent is considered or that punishment is propor-
tionate to the wrong committed.61 
For these critics, fairness requires the adjudicative process to 
adhere to a system of rule-based protections for the accused 
and for the ensuing punishment to be restrained by well-
defined boundaries. The first part of the objection—fairness in 
adjudication—need not be fatal for shaming sanctions. While it 
is acknowledged that the lack of a tribunal can lead to a politi-
cization of shaming as an enforcement mechanism, this cannot 
lead to the conclusion that it is always politicized or useless. 
Indeed, shaming becomes particularly useful when a given 
state refuses to submit itself to the adjudication of any tribu-
nal, thereby attempting to place itself above the law. Moreover, 
the shaming reference group is capable of achieving acceptable 
levels of adjudicative neutrality, thus giving an opportunity for 
the accused state to defend itself, protecting against illegal co-
ercion and taking account of precedent. 
The second objection—lack of proportionality in punish-
ment—is more difficult because of at least two different prob-
lems: delegation and dispersion. Punishment is delegated to 
other actors who do not always have a legal obligation to en-
force it, meaning that the sanction can be empty in some in-
stances. Dispersion refers to the multiplicity of actors in the 
enforcer group, resulting in different actors enforcing the pun-
ishment to varying degrees, potentially over-punishing some 
offenders and under-punishing others, and creating incentives 
for free-riding.62 Even worse, unpredictable enforcement of the 
primary sanction and uncontrollable secondary effects might 
have disproportionate consequences for some accused even 
without a finding of guilt.63 
II. A FRAMEWORK FOR SHAMING IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
This Article attempts to develop a structure for the applica-
tion of shaming in IL that accommodates the objections ad-
vanced in the domestic context and satisfies the demands of 
                                                                                                             
 61. Cf. id. 
 62. See Whitman, supra note 5, at 1088. 
 63. The suicide of a prosecutor who allegedly solicited a person he believed 
to be thirteen years of age following a Dateline NBC sting operation is a so-
bering reminder of the dangerous consequences. See Tim Eaton, Prosecutor 
Kills Himself in Texas Raid over Child Sex, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2006), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/07/us/07pedophile.html. 
2014] ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL LAW 87 
theoretical coherence. The first challenge in the IL context per-
tains to the target of the shaming sanction. Who is to be 
shamed? Is it the state, its citizens, the regime, or a combina-
tion of all three? 
A. Shaming the State 
The principle of shaming the state is based on commonly un-
derstood notions of enterprise liability.64 As is the case with col-
lectively organized forms of business, such as corporations, lia-
bility is imposed on the collective body that bears responsibility 
for the actions of its agents. Enterprise liability externalizes 
the cost of monitoring when the conduct is at the micro-level, 
with attendant asymmetries of knowledge, resources, and in-
formation between enforcers and offenders.65 The prospect of 
liability creates incentives for the entity to invest in monitoring 
the conduct of its agents.66 In the case of large modern compa-
nies, when agents engage in bad conduct, they are disciplined 
by their superiors and the chain of responsibility for monitor-
ing stops with shareholders. 
Transposing this idea at the level of the state, when public of-
ficials act in breach of their legal obligations, shame is imposed 
on the state, negatively affecting its self-image. There may be 
internal and external aspects to this shame depending upon 
the depth of a state’s sense of identity. Under ideal conditions, 
for a state with a strong sense of identity and attendant con-
ceptions of national pride, the imposition of a shame sanction 
triggers internal consequences. These might be manifested by 
exercises in self-reflection,67 formalized institutional processes 
aimed at establishing the truth and identifying offenders,68 
                                                                                                             
 64. See Skeel, supra note 12, at 1816. 
 65. See generally Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and 
the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857 (1984). 
 66. See Skeel, supra note 12, at 1829–32. 
 67. See E. Dresler-Hawke & J.H. Liu, Collective Shame and the Position-
ing of German National Identity, 32 PSICOLOGÍA POLÍTICA 131–34 (2006) 
(Spain); Michael Johns et al., Ashamed to Be an American? The Role of Iden-
tification in Predicting Vicarious Shame for Anti-Arab Prejudice after 9-11, 4 
SELF & IDENTITY 332–33 (2005). 
 68. See Nicholas Cecil & Paul Cheston, Day of Shame for British Army: 
Shocking Brutality Uncovered by Inquiry, LONDON EVENING STANDARD (Sept. 
8, 2011), http://www.standard.co.uk/news/day-of-shame-for-british-army-
shocking-brutality-uncovered-by-inquiry-6441146.html. 
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structural reforms,69 corrective legislation, punishment for of-
fenders,70 reparations for victims,71 and apologies.72  In other 
circumstances, whether it is because a state does not have a 
strong sense of identity and national pride, or because a state 
that possesses these attributes denies wrongdoing, shaming 
has largely external consequences.73 
Under either scenario, shaming at the entity level creates in-
centives for better monitoring and law abidance. In some cases, 
such incentives might result in greater investment in the pro-
motion of good conduct (e.g., improving the training of police or 
military personnel, or employing more lawyers in the defense 
hierarchy to ensure that operational decisions are undertaken 
with reference to IL) or in the monitoring function (e.g., record-
ing equipment for custodial interrogations, anti-corruption 
                                                                                                             
 69. See Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, International Law and State So-
cialization: Conceptual, Empirical, and Normative Challenges, 54 DUKE L.J. 
983, 991–96 (2005). 
 70. See Liz Beavers, England back in Mineral County, CUMBERLAND TIMES 
(Mar. 25, 2007), http://times-news.com/archive/x1540389540; Graner Gets 10 
Years for Abu Ghraib Abuse, NBC NEWS (Jan. 16, 2005), 
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scandal at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, several U.S. military personnel serving 
at the prison were convicted on multiple charges by court martial and incar-
cerated). 
 71. For example, Maher Arar, a Syrian-Canadian who was subjected to 
rendition in Syria after Canadian officials suspected him of terrorist activi-
ties, was awarded CDN$10.5 million in damages from the Canadian govern-
ment following a public inquiry. Josh Tapper, Barack Obama Should Apolo-
gize to Maher Arar, Rights Groups Say, TORONTO STAR (May 22, 2012), 
http://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2012/05/22/barack_obama_should_apolo
gize_to_maher_arar_rights_groups_say.html. 
 72. See, e.g., Kevin Rudd, Prime Minister of Austl., Apology to the Stolen 
Generations, Address before the 42nd Parliament of Australia (Feb. 13, 
2008), available at http://www.dfat.gov.au/indigenous/apology-to-stolen-
generations/national_apology.html. 
 73. Libya’s oil industry, for example, was hit hard by U.N. sanctions im-
posed after the bombing of two commercial airplanes in the late 1980s. By 
2001, the total cost of these sanctions to the Libyan economy was estimated 
to be US$18 billion by the World Bank and US$33 billion by the Libyan gov-
ernment. Ray Takeyh, The Rogue Who Came in from the Cold, 80 FOREIGN 
AFF. 62, 64 (2001). Sanctions against the Ian Smith regime in Rhodesia suc-
ceeded in making the country wholly dependent on trade with apartheid-era 
South Africa. Robert O. Matthews, From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe: Prerequi-
sites of a Settlement, 45 INT’L J. 292, 301 (1990). Once Western countries 
managed to disrupt that trading relationship, the Rhodesian economy was 
brought to its knees. Id. at 327. 
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staff, and human rights commissions), while in other cases it 
translates into greater resources for enforcement (e.g., more 
police, courts, and prisons). In theory, the net result from the 
operation of these incentives is that a state acts rationally to 
minimize the probability of being punished because it cares 
about the negative consequences of shaming. 
The evidence is less clear. Other things being equal, shaming 
sanctions appear to be imposed less frequently on stronger 
states than weaker states.74 Authors who have studied sham-
ing by the United Nations Human Rights Commission 
(“UNHRC”) write that despite numerous attempts to censure 
China between 1991 and 2001, none proved to be successful.75 
The study examined other variables that predicted when a 
state would become a target for shaming at the UNHRC. States 
seen to be more cooperative than others or those that made a 
greater contribution to common objectives were unsurprisingly 
less likely to be targeted by other states.76 
Extrapolating from the evidence, the difficulty of punishing 
the powerful relative to the weak is not necessarily a problem 
as long as punishment is attempted. The authors claim that IL 
affects state behavior in ways that matter for law, not that all 
states consistently receive equal punishment. In other words, it 
suffices for the authors’ model that states are targeted when 
violations are observed, because it is then clear that norms are 
being validly asserted and evaluative opinions about the of-
fender’s conduct are being made by the shaming reference 
group. The ultimate success of prosecution and the degree of 
                                                                                                             
 74. See James H. Lebovic & Erik Voeten, The Politics of Shame: The Con-
demnation of Country Human Rights Practices in the UNCHR, 50 INT’L STUD. 
Q. 861, 879 (2006). During the Cold War, “a state with average capabilities 
was able to escape sanctions or to keep the charges against it confidential 
[43]% of the time; a state with capabilities one standard deviation above the 
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nounced in the post-Cold War period where the values are 25% and 42%, re-
spectively. Id. 
 75. See id. at 866. As the ability of Saudi Arabia and China to escape con-
demnation indicates, there is still good reason to be suspicious of the impar-
tiality of the UNHCR’s public shaming process. See id. at 884. 
 76. During the Cold War period, a state with a perfect attendance record 
in the U.N. General Assembly (“UNGA”) was nearly half as likely as a coun-
try that participated only 50% of the time to have a public resolution adopted 
against it. Id. at 878. 
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punishment imposed is a function of a number of factors, not 
the least of which are the availability of convincing proof and 
the power and resources possessed by the defendant—no dif-
ferent from domestic law enforcement. 
Shaming at the entity level is necessary because states are 
the primary actors in IL and regularly make promises or other 
contractual commitments to each other. While states might ad-
here to these commitments for any number of reasons, coercive 
enforcement is necessary if these commitments are to be re-
garded as legally binding. Therefore, a key test of these com-
mitments is whether there is enforcement in practice. Lebovic 
and Voeten’s study examined the consequences for states that 
ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (“ICCPR”) and found that “[d]uring the Cold War, tar-
geted states that ratified the ICCPR treaty were more than 
twice as likely (a mean predicted probability of 0.79 vs. 0.33) to 
be shamed by public resolution than were other states.”77 It 
seems that when states ratify pieces of international law, they 
create a set of contractual expectations about their subsequent 
conduct.78 The architecture of a particular international legal 
instrument sets the contours for the legal obligations assumed 
by the ratifying state and provides criteria for other states to 
make evaluative judgments about whether behavior matches 
up with performance expectations.79 
                                                                                                             
 77. Id. at 878. “[C]ommitting publicly to uphold a set of human rights 
norms does carry political consequences: states that have made a formal 
promise are held to a higher standard than states that have not done so.” Id. 
 78. The study by Lebovic and Voeten revealed that members that signed 
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tices in the UNHRC are based, in part, 
by a desire to hold states accountable for their commitments. . . . 
[C]ountries that ratified the ICCPR treaty do not appear to share 
characteristics, e.g., human rights records, that explain the precipi-
tous rise in the probability of a vote to punish a target when the tar-
get and voter are both parties to the ICCPR treaty. 
Id. at 882. 
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acts of signing and ratifying a treaty or achieving formal membership within 
IOs seem to contribute directly toward reputation-building in the interna-
tional community. See id. If these agreements and memberships matter, it is 
in “raisi[ng] expectations when members of the community evaluate[] the 
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A complicating factor for shaming at the entity level is its po-
liticization.80 This is particularly problematic at the multilat-
eral organization level when there is capture by partisan inter-
ests. One study of practice at the UNHRC found that during 
the Cold War, alignment with the United States greatly in-
creased the prospect that countries would be subject to severe 
sanctions.81 This likelihood declined after the Cold War, but 
states were more likely to favor countries with similar alliances 
and to oppose countries with dissimilar alliances.82 This con-
clusion is further reinforced by the impact of a convergence in 
domestic ideology.83 
While the authors acknowledge that politicization is prob-
lematic for shaming in IL, it is fairly endemic in all interna-
tional relations and need not be a fatal objection. Japan’s for-
eign aid policy is a good example of politicization. Japan has 
been particularly transparent about using its foreign economic 
aid program to influence the behavior of other states. This ex-
tends to whether or not a recipient state votes in the U.N. Gen-
eral Assembly (“UNGA”) in conformity with Japanese foreign 
policy objectives. France is another example: one study found 
that the average developing country voted in the same direc-
tion as France 64% of the time in the UNGA.84 One standard 
deviation in voting behaviour, an increase to voting with 
France 73% of the time, resulted in a 96% increase in foreign 
aid to that country.85 Similarly, a standard deviation in voting 
in favor of the United States resulted in an increase of U.S. aid 
by 78% to the country voting the “right” way, while one stand-
ard deviation in voting in favor of Japanese policies resulted in 
a staggering 345% increase in Japanese foreign aid to that na-
tion.86 
                                                                                                             
conduct of other states.” Id. Simply put, states expect others to deliver on 
their promises. See id. 
 80. “[F]oreign policy positions, as measured by [votes] in the UNGA, has a 
significant and strong influence over whether a state voted not to punish oth-
er (hence, the negative coefficients) in both the Cold War and post-Cold War 
periods.” Id. at 883. 
 81. Id. at 878. 
 82. Id. at 883. 
 83. Id. at 882. 
 84. Alberto Alesina & David Dollar, Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom, 5 J. 
ECON. GROWTH 33, 46 (2000). 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
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Such beneficence has also been used to coerce other states in-
to compliance with the favored agenda of the donor. Japan is 
alleged to have dispatched a delegation to Geneva shortly be-
fore the 2004 World Trade Organization (“WTO”) General 
Council meeting in an effort to coerce weaker states to conform 
to its platform. Asian countries in receipt of Japanese aid were 
reportedly told that if they contravened vital Japanese objec-
tives at the Council meeting—having the so-called three Sin-
gapore issues (investment, competition, and transparency in 
government procedure) dropped from the agenda—Japan’s 
support for the development of their infrastructure could be at 
risk.87 
Most notoriously of all, Japan uses its clout to punish and 
reward weak states for their stance vis-à-vis the whaling in-
dustry. At the International Whaling Commission (“IWC”), Ja-
pan not only pays members of the IWC to vote in its interests, 
it also pays nations to join the organization via its Overseas 
Development Assistance program.88 For each 10% increase in 
the number of votes a recipient state cast in favor of Japan at 
the IWC between 1999 and 2004, it received an increase of 
US$2.10 per capita in aid.89 When a nation votes in Japan’s in-
terests at the IWC, it receives an economic reward in the form 
of development aid; when a nation fails to conform to this be-
havior, it is punished by having aid withheld. Thus, far from 
using its clout to enforce compliance with IL, Japan punishes 
states that comply more fully with what many would regard as 
positive developments in international environmental law, 
namely the protection of endangered species. 
It is thus necessary to employ caution in sifting between be-
havior that seeks to move states into compliance with a third 
state’s foreign policy objectives, and that which seeks to move 
them into compliance with IL norms. The former will often 
simply deprive the recalcitrant state of a covetable good, 
                                                                                                             
 87. Aileen Kwa, WTO: A Game of Serious Arm Twisting, 441 NEW AFR. J. 
46, 46 (2005). 
 88. Ofer Eldar, Vote-Trading in International Institutions, 19 EUR. J. INT’L 
L. 3, 35 (2008). Chief recipients include “St. Lucia, St. Vincent, St. Kitts and 
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whereas the latter will usually explicitly link economic harm or 
reputational damage to a violation of IL. Shaming is more like-
ly to do the latter. 
Despite the above examples of politicization in international 
relations, states are not as hypocritical as might have been ex-
pected in imposing shame sanctions on other states. At least 
one study found that states with good domestic records were 
more liable to shame other states at the UNHRC than states 
with poor records for human rights protections at the domestic 
level.90 This did not hold true when there was a strong history 
of religious or ethnic conflict between states. 
B. Shaming at Work: Libya and Sri Lanka  
Shaming at the entity level has an additional problem: unsat-
isfactory determination of responsibility for wrongdoing and 
punishment without identifying the actual offenders. This is 
illustrated by the treatment of Libya following the Lockerbie 
incident. On September 21, 1988, a bomb was placed on Pan 
Am flight 103, travelling from London to New York. 91  The 
bomb exploded as the plane flew over Lockerbie, Scotland, “kill-
ing all 259 people on board and eleven on the ground.”92 The 
victims were mainly American and British nationals.93 After 
nearly two decades of low-level military attacks and counter-
attacks between the United States and Libya,94 the latter was 
not held in high esteem in the Western world and international 
suspicion gravitated towards it.95 
Following a prolonged investigation, indictments for murder 
were issued by both the United States and Scotland against 
Abdelbaset al-Megrahi and Lamin Khalifa Fhimah (both Liby-
                                                                                                             
 90. Lebovic & Voeten, supra note 74, at 861. 
 91. Bernd Martenczuk, The Security Council, the International Court, and 
Judicial Review: What Lessons from Lockerbie?, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 517, 520 
(1999). 
 92. Id. 
 93. See Victims, VICTIMS OF PAN AM FLIGHT 103, INC. (Aug. 22, 2009), 
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 95. See Key Facts: Libya Sanctions, CNN (Feb. 10, 2004), 
http://articles.cnn.com/2004-02-10/world/libya.sanctions.facts_1_libya-
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was also blamed for the 1989 bombing of a French airliner (UTA Flight 772) 
over the Niger desert that killed 170 people. Id. 
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an Airlines officials) on November 14, 1991. 96  The United 
States and U.K. issued a joint statement on November 27th 
demanding that the suspects be extradited to their territory for 
trial,97 a request declined by Libya.98 
The Lockerbie case provides useful material for the study of 
IL enforcement, as the resulting shaming directed at Libya was 
very much cast in terms of IL violations. If al-Megrahi and 
Fhirmah were responsible for the bombings and if they were 
acting under orders from the Libyan State, there was a breach 
of the 1971 Montreal Convention on the Suppression of Unlaw-
ful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation.99 Assuming the 
suspects acted on their own volition, a breach of Article 11 of 
the 1971 Convention would arise. The states affected by the 
bombings—the United States, U.K., and France—are all per-
manent members of the U.N. Security Council (“S.C.”). As such, 
they utilized their position to ensure that any ambiguities 
about whether a breach of IL had occurred were addressed. 
Working together, the United States, U.K, and France were 
able to convince the S.C. to pass several resolutions. S.C. Res. 
731 qualified the Lockerbie incident as an act of “international 
terrorism” that constituted a threat to international peace and 
security, and also referred to earlier Resolutions 286 and 635, 
which obligated states to refrain from interfering with interna-
tional civil aviation.100 S.C. Res. 748 added to this with an in-
terpretation of Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter to the effect that 
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“every State has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigat-
ing, assisting or participating in terrorist acts in another State 
or acquiescing in organized activities within its territory di-
rected towards the commission of such acts, when such acts in-
volve a threat or use of force.”101 Resolution 748 also specifically 
stated that Libya’s failure to cooperate (by refusing to extradite 
al-Megrahi and Fhirmah) “constitute[d] a threat to interna-
tional peace and security.”102 Resolution 748, instituted under 
Chapter VII, demanded compliance with (non-binding) Resolu-
tion 731,103 which had in turn demanded that Libya comply 
with the United States’ and U.K.’s requests for the suspects’ 
extradition.104 
Resolution 748 also imposed sanctions on Libya, which were 
to last until compliance was achieved. These included denying 
overflight rights to aircraft flying to or from Libya, denying 
Libya any aircraft or parts thereof, denying arms or arms 
training, and curtailing diplomatic activity.105 These sanctions 
were later tightened via S.C. Resolution 883.106 Whether or not 
Libya was in violation of the 1971 Montreal Convention, it was 
now certainly in violation of international law in the form of 
S.C. Resolution 748. 
This in itself points to a state’s desire to be seen not as uni-
laterally imposing what they view as “right” via methods such 
as shame, but as agents of law enforcement within a legal 
framework. Shame is thus very much a tool of IL enforcement. 
That the goal of the United States, the U.K., and France in 
passing S.C. resolutions on the topic was to alter the legal pa-
rameters of the incident is confirmed by the fact that they ex-
plicitly referred to this alteration as the only relevant law dur-
ing later proceedings before the International Court of Justice 
(“ICJ”).107 
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Libya also adopted a legalistic stance on the issue, turning to 
the ICJ108 and asking the court to declare that it had complied 
with all of its obligations under the Montreal Convention, af-
firm that the United States and U.K. were obliged to desist 
from using force or the threat thereof against it, and grant 
temporary relief.109 The court declined the plea for temporary 
relief,110 but eventually determined that it had jurisdiction and 
that the case centered on differing interpretations of Articles 7 
and 11 of the Montreal Convention.111 The court did not take 
S.C. Resolutions 748 and 883 into consideration when deter-
mining its jurisdiction, as these resolutions had been passed 
after Libya filed the case.112 
The legal basis of the case against Libya was thus weaker 
than the United States and U.K. had hoped it would be.113 
This, however, was at best a Pyrrhic victory for Libya, as it had 
already very much been “tried in the press” and its interna-
tional reputation was in tatters. Firmly cast in the role of 
“rogue State,” Libya was increasingly isolated by erstwhile 
trading partners, such as Germany and Italy, and left bereft of 
a superpower patron after the collapse of the Soviet Union,114 
while Western states rolled out the red carpet to revolutionary 
figures such as Yasser Arafat and Nelson Mandela—both of 
whom had received considerable aid from Gaddafi at the lowest 
                                                                                                             
 108. Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Con-
vention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.S.), Provi-
sional Measures, 1992 I.C.J. 114, pmbl. (Apr. 14). 
 109. Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Con-
vention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.S.), Appli-
cation Instituting Proceedings, 5–6 (Mar. 3, 1992), available at 
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/89/7209.pdf. See also Questions of Interpre-
tation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the 
Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.S.), Request for the Indication of 
Provisional Measures of Protection Submitted by the Government of the So-
cialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, ¶ 7 (Mar. 3, 1992), available at 
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/89/13253.pdf. 
 110. See Libya v. United States, Provisional Measures, 1992 I.C.J. at 127. 
 111. Aerial Incident at Lockerbie, Preliminary Objections, 1998 I.C.J. ¶¶ 28, 
32, 35. 
 112. Id. ¶¶ 37, 43, 44. 
 113. See id. ¶ 38. 
 114. Takeyh, supra note 73, at 63, 64. 
2014] ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL LAW 97 
points of their struggles,115 and neither of whom were less vio-
lent in pursuing their goals.116 
To compound the issue, Libya continued to refuse to extradite 
the two suspects to the United States or U.K., claiming the 
suspects would not receive a fair trial.117 Libya did offer to ex-
tradite them to Malta (where the bomb was set in motion), an 
offer that was rejected on the grounds that Malta’s geographic 
proximity to Libya would render it subject to improper influ-
ence.118 In 1994, Libya offered to hand over al-Megrahi and 
Fhirmah for trial under Scottish law in the Netherlands; this 
too was initially rejected.119 However, as third nations began to 
voice objections to the U.N. sanctions against Libya, the United 
States and U.K. thawed in their attitudes.120 
Under these conditions, Gaddafi reached a compromise with 
the United States and U.K. by which they would accept a trial 
under Scottish law in the Netherlands.121 U.N. monitors would 
be stationed in the Scottish prison should the suspects be con-
victed and subsequently serve their sentences there,122 and it 
was rumored that the prosecution would agree in advance not 
to attempt to trace orders for a bombing to Gaddafi himself.123 
Furthermore, the trial would be conducted by a judge, not ju-
ry. 124  This deal was accepted and al-Megrahi and Fhirmah 
were duly handed over in 1999, while the U.N. suspended sanc-
tions against Libya via S.C. Resolution 1192.125 Al-Megrahi was 
convicted and Fhirmah was acquitted.126 Evidence in the case 
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was not entirely convincing, and the judgment itself was heavi-
ly criticized,127 but the decision allowed all nations involved to 
move on from the incident. 
Although U.N. sanctions were suspended in 1999, Libya—
which had suffered an estimated US$18 billion in lost revenue 
while they were in place—128wanted them cancelled. To achieve 
this, it agreed to pay US$2.7 billion in compensation to the vic-
tims’ families, to be released in several tranches.129 The first 
tranche would come with the cancellation of U.N. sanctions, 
and these were duly lifted on September 12, 2003.130 Libya 
never admitted guilt for the Lockerbie bombings, but issued a 
letter to the U.N. in 2003 stating that it “accept[ed] responsibil-
ity for the actions of its officials.”131 The United States, U.K., 
and Libya also removed the pending ICJ decision from the 
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court’s docket through a joint statement in 2003.132 In 2005, 
American energy companies began investing in Libya and full 
diplomatic relations were restored in 2006.133 
The result seems to be that even absent convincing evidence 
about Libya’s responsibility for the Lockerbie bombing, the 
state experienced the full external consequences of a shame 
sanction. This is a powerful example of the coercive power of 
shaming, all the more so if Libya was in fact innocent. Not only 
was Libya coerced by shaming, the enforcer states may have 
succeeded in deterring other states contemplating similar ter-
rorist actions by making the action extremely costly. If Libya 
was in fact responsible, the case provides a good example of 
shaming as an effective tool to enforce IL rules following the 
correct identification of the offender through a law enforcement 
framework. 
Sri Lanka offers another example of IL enforcement vis-à-vis 
shaming. Following the conclusion of the military campaign 
commenced under the leadership of President Mahinda Ra-
japaksa against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(“LTTE”), which resulted in over 40,000 civilian deaths, 134 
thousands of Tamils continue to be housed in temporary 
camps.135 Camp conditions are horrific both in physical and 
human rights terms; many are allegedly being held incommu-
nicado for suspected links with the LTTE.136 In addition, there 
are allegations that the media has been intimidated through 
killings, torture, disappearances and detentions.137 
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The government’s vociferous denials of wrongdoing have been 
dented by video and other evidence of troops executing bound 
captives;138 a U.N. expert confirmed that a mobile phone video 
showing one such killing was genuine after three forensic ex-
perts viewed the footage.139  There is evidence that some of 
these gross abuses were authorized at the highest levels of 
command: Amnesty International Asia Program Director Sam 
Zarifi claimed that execution orders had been issued by the de-
fense secretary, who is also the president’s brother.140 A 2009 
U.S. State Department report documented that Sri Lankan 
government forces shelled civilian areas and caused deaths be-
fore the expiry of a publicly announced ceasefire.141 Captives 
and combatants who sought to surrender were allegedly 
slaughtered.142 The report also documented cases of disappear-
ances and killings in custody.143 A similar report has been is-
sued by Amnesty International.144 
The international community has repeatedly called upon Ra-
japaksa to remedy human rights violations.145 After its pleas 
were ignored, the EU suspended the Generalised System of 
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Preferences Plus (“GSP+”) for Sri Lanka.146 The GSP+ conces-
sions are extremely important as goods from countries accorded 
GSP+ are offered reduced tariffs when entering the EU mar-
ket.147 Sri Lanka’s suspension was based on a European Com-
mission investigation concluding that Sri Lanka was in breach 
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the 
Convention against Torture, and the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child.148 The EU’s actions in this instance carried some 
punch: imports from Sri Lanka under GSP+ amounted to €1.24 
billion in 2008 and the Sri Lankans depend heavily on the EU 
because it is their largest export market.149 This is not the only 
tool in the EU’s box; it could suspend Sri Lanka from GSP+ 
treatment altogether despite there being no human rights re-
quirements under that scheme.150 
The EU was not alone in shaming Sri Lanka. The UNHRC 
voted in March 2012 to urge Sri Lanka to investigate human 
rights violations.151 This was in response to a desperate cam-
paign, both of persuasion and intimidation, launched by the Sri 
Lankans to stop the passage of the resolution. The resolution 
also encouraged “the [Sri Lankan] government to implement 
the recommendations of its own Lessons Learnt and Reconcili-
ation Commission.”152 The Sri Lankan government lobbied for-
eign states via telephone calls and meetings and tried to intim-
idate civil rights groups travelling to the meeting. 153  Why 
would Sri Lanka engage in such acts if shaming is not power-
ful? 
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This is not the only instance of such behavior. In May 2009, 
the EU sought to initiate a resolution against Sri Lanka at the 
UNHRC by calling a special session.154 Sri Lanka, in a smart 
procedural tactic, tabled its own resolution before the EU could 
make its proposal, ensuring that Sri Lanka’s resolution would 
be the basis for negotiation.155 It lobbied other states and de-
feated the EU’s amendments.156 These and other actions show 
that the Sri Lankan government is acutely aware of the coer-
civeness of shaming and acts aggressively to resist the imposi-
tion of shame sanctions just as it might resist traditional sanc-
tions. 
In sum, shaming the state comports with familiar notions of 
attributive liability. As is the case with the traditional punish-
ments imposed on entities under domestic law, shaming entails 
similar but nonfatal objections: partisanship, sensitivity to eco-
nomic and power influence, flaws in identification of actual of-
fenders, and lack of proportionality. 
C. Shaming the Regime, Government, or Ruler 
Shaming the regime or government, rather than the state at 
the entity level, may be necessary when the latter is either in-
congruent with blame for the wrong or when shaming the enti-
ty is ineffective. Several reasons for this divergence exist. First, 
the relationship between the offending public officials and the 
citizens of the state is likely to be quite attenuated. Under such 
circumstances, imposing shame on the state is both unfair and 
ineffective: unfair because the sanction punishes innocent peo-
ple and ineffective because there is no congruence between the 
offender and the citizenry. In other words, the average citizen 
is unlikely to experience shame due to the actions of a small 
number of public officials over whom he has little direct control 
and whose actions he may not have initially approved. This is 
exacerbated in states where the regime is in power without 
popular support. Second, the heterogeneity in many modern 
states makes it difficult to find sufficient congruity of interests 
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within a domestic population for strong feelings of identity to 
exist. Even where such strong national identities exist, these 
may not always inure to the benefit of a ruling group. For ex-
ample, many Middle Eastern states possess strong Islamic 
identities, but there is a division between the regime and the 
population where issues involving international relations are 
concerned. 
Some of the conceptual difficulties to shaming the state as an 
entity can be resolved by shaming the responsible regime in-
stead. Even so, fairness requires that shame should be restrict-
ed to the individual offenders rather than extended to the en-
tire government. For example, shaming the Iraqi government 
for its invasion of Kuwait in 1991 would punish people who ei-
ther had nothing to do with the invasion or who had objected to 
it. Given that dissent and resignation from the government 
were not realistic options for individuals in the government for 
fear of Saddam Hussein, shaming the Iraqi government as a 
whole would be particularly cruel. 
One response might be to limit shaming to the ruler when the 
decision is made by him or at his behest. This has the virtue of 
protecting innocent actors from undeserved punishment. How-
ever, for such shaming to be effective, the state has to be ruled 
by an individual with real decision-making authority and pow-
er over subordinates. In an ideal scenario, shaming triggers 
both an internal and external response by the ruler. The re-
sponse is internal in the sense that the ruler experiences moral 
shame and undertakes corrective action to punish wrongdoers, 
compensate victims, and prevent future occurrences because he 
genuinely believes that the conduct is wrongful.157 In less ideal 
conditions, the response might be purely external: faced with 
the shame sanction, the ruler takes some action to assuage ex-
ternal actors while continuing to covertly condone or ignore the 
wrong. These externally directed actions might be accompanied 
by denials of any wrongdoing.158 
Shaming the ruler comes with its own set of incentive effects. 
A rational ruler will factor in the cost of shaming before engag-
ing in any conduct with international implications. If the bene-
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fits of the conduct exceed the potential cost from the shaming, 
the probability of detection, or a combination of both, the ra-
tional ruler might engage in that action. If the cost exceeds the 
benefits, a rational ruler will forego the action. A rational ruler 
might also attempt to hide misconduct by lower level function-
aries,159 because it is only when the misconduct receives wide-
spread public scrutiny that responsibility shifts from lower lev-
el officials to the ruler with the prospect of shaming.160 Thus, 
one of the unintended consequences of shaming the ruler might 
be to create incentives for suppressing information about 
wrongs committed by lower level officials. 
The coercive power of shaming at the individual level is vari-
able. For example, rulers with strong claims to moral or ethical 
leadership,161 whose grip on power is infirm,162 who need good 
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reputations to join regional associations or trade groups,163 who 
need to attract international investment, 164  who need loans 
from multilateral lending agencies,165 and who need support 
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 163. In this context, one could consider Turkey’s long-running efforts to join 
the EU, which have required it to undertake a number of human rights-
related reforms, such as abolishing the death penalty, increasing linguistic 
rights for minorities, and passing a new penal code aimed at curtailing gen-
der-based violence and other serious inequalities. Helena Smith, Human 
Rights Record Haunts Turkey’s EU Ambitions, GUARDIAN (Dec. 13, 2004), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/dec/13/eu.turkey1. See CODE CRIMINAL 
[C. CRIM.], arts. 3(2), 46, 102, 122 (Turk.). According to the Turkish Minister 
for European Affairs, Egeman Bagis, “[s]ince 2011, Turkey has adopted 320 
laws and 1,555 secondary regulations to harmonise its national legislation 
with the EU acquis,” while “[t]he Turkish government maintains that the 
new constitution being drafted by a parliamentary committee will comply 
with EU standards.” Menekse Tokyay, Turkey’s EU Bid Faces Opportunities 
and Challenges in 2013, SETIMES.COM (Dec. 24, 2012), 
http://setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/mobile/en_GB/features/setimes/articles/201
2/12/24/reportage-01. 
 164. Libya, for example, eventually agreed to extradite two suspects in the 
Pan-Am bombing and to pay compensation to the victims’ families following a 
decades-long shame campaign spearheaded by the United States and the 
U.K. Key Facts: Libya Sanctions, supra note 95. The removal of sanctions 
that followed permitted Libya to normalize its aviation industry and to at-
tract much needed foreign investment to fully exploit its oilfields. See John H. 
Donboli & Farnaz Kashefi, Doing Business in the Middle East: A Primer for 
U.S. Companies, 38 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 413, 450–51 (2005); Jad Mouawad, 
Libya Tempts Executives with Big Oil Reserves, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 2, 2005), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/01/02/business/02libya.html. 
 165. In 1994, the World Bank obligated Burkina Faso to “incorporate a 
pledge in its policy framework paper to curb female genital mutilation.” Can-
an Gunduz, Human Rights and Development: The World Bank’s Need for a 
Consistent Approach 19 (London Sch. of Econ., Dev. Studies Inst. Working 
Paper Series, Paper No. 04-49, 2004), available at 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/internationalDevelopment/pdf/WP/WP49.pdf. Two years 
later, Burkina Faso criminalized female genital mutilation and formed “a 
national committee to combat the practice.” See Heidi Jones et al., Female 
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from allies166 are probably most responsive to shame sanctions. 
In contrast, rulers who resist external norms,167 have estab-
lished reputations for denouncing the dominant international 
actors,168 or are pursuing a different ideology that provides in-
                                                                                                             
Genital Cutting Practices in Burkina Faso and Mali and Their Negative 
Health Outcomes, 30 STUD. FAM. PLAN. 219, 220 (1999). 
 166. Israel, for example, enjoys a human rights record that is far from spot-
less, but also takes care not to endanger support from its key allies: the Unit-
ed States, the U.K., and Germany. Examples include complex and rigorous 
rules regarding targeted assassination (intended to minimize civilian casual-
ties), see generally HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. State 
of Isr. 46 I.L.M. 375 [2005] (Isr.), efforts to keep its nuclear weapons program 
low-key, and efforts to comply with provisions of the Geneva Conventions 
mandating civilian protection, such as leaflet drops warning Gaza residents 
to keep away from Hamas buildings before air raids. See Olga Kazan, Israeli 
Army Drops Warning Leaflets on Gaza, WASH. POST BLOG (Nov. 15, 2012, 8:50 
AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2012/11/15/israeli-
army-drops-warning-leaflets-on-gaza/. 
 167. In 2008, Robert Mugabe was stripped of his honorary British knight-
hood that had been bestowed upon him in 1994 “as a mark of revulsion at the 
abuse of human rights and abject disregard for the democratic process in 
Zimbabwe over which President Mugabe has presided.” Mugabe Is Stripped 
of Knighthood as ‘a Mark of Revulsion,’ SCOTSMAN (June 25, 2008), 
http://www.scotsman.com/news/uk/mugabe-is-stripped-of-knighthood-as-a-
mark-of-revulsion-1-1077561. In close temporal proximity, Mugabe was 
stripped of several honorary degrees he had been awarded by Western uni-
versities in the 1980s and 1990s. See, e.g., Paul Kelbie, Edinburgh University 
Revokes Mugabe Degree, GUARDIAN (July 14, 2007), 
http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2007/jul/15/highereducation.internationaledu
cationnews; Michigan State Revokes Mugabe’s Honorary Degree, DIVERSE 
(Sept. 16, 2008), http://diverseeducation.com/article/11685. This does not 
seem to have had much impact on Mugabe, as his chief spokesperson George 
Charamba is quoted as saying “[Mugabe] does not lose sleep over threats. . . . 
Honorary degrees are exactly that, an unsolicited honor from the giver. If 
anything, those Western universities improved their international profile by 
associating themselves with the president.” Angus Shaw, Mugabe Not Both-
ered by Moves to Strip Honorary Degrees, BOSTON.COM (Apr. 25, 2007), 
http://www.boston.com/news/education/higher/articles/2007/04/25/mugabe_no
t_bothered_by_moves_to_strip_honorary_degrees/. 
 168. Hugo Chavez was a good example of such a figure. Chavez is perhaps 
most infamous for “leading the ‘Bolivarian revolution’ against the ‘empire’ 
(i.e., the United States).” Hugo Chávez’s Rotten Legacy, ECONOMIST (Mar. 9, 
2013), http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21573106-appeal-populist-
autocracy-has-been-weakened-not-extinguished-hugo-ch%C3%A1vezs-rotten. 
At a press conference on August 2, 2012, Chavez denounced European na-
tions for funding Syrian rebels/terrorists in the ongoing conflict in that coun-
try. Venezuela’s President Hugo Chavez Criticizes West over Syria, GUARDIAN 
(Aug. 2, 2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/video/2012/aug/02/venezuela-
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ternal justifications for their actions169 are unlikely to be re-
sponsive to shaming. These effects are exacerbated if the ruler 
is also from a powerful country with substantial bargaining 
power.170 Under such circumstances, a ruler is likely to be less 
responsive to shame sanctions because of the strategic or eco-
nomic importance of his country.171 
                                                                                                             
hugo-chavez-syria-video. See also Chavez, Ahmadinejad Denounce West’s Im-
perialist Aggression in Libya, Syria, JAGRAN POST (Aug. 17, 2011), 
http://post.jagran.com/chavez-ahmadinejad-denounce-wests-imperialist-
aggression-in-libya-syria-1313592746. In 2006, Chavez famously referred to 
then-U.S. President George Bush as “the devil” during a speech to the UNGA, 
taking the opportunity in follow-up interviews to criticize the second Iraq 
War and “Washington-backed capitalist reforms in Latin America.” Tim 
Padgett, Chavez: “Bush Has Called Me Worse Things,” TIME (Sept. 22, 2006), 
http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1538296,00.html#ixzz2G6B
zUvhc. 
 169. For example, the Taliban destroyed the irreplaceable Bamiyan Bud-
dhas in 2001 due to “a religious obligation to destroy idols,” despite an inter-
national outcry that included several countries, including Iran, offering to 
purchase the historical statues. Alex Spillius, Taliban Ignore All Appeals to 
Save Buddhas, TELEGRAPH (Mar. 5, 2001), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/1325119/Taliba
n-ignore-all-appeals-to-save-Buddhas.html. 
 170. China and Russia have both been able to use their permanent seats on 
the Security Council to avoid action on Tibet and Chechnya, respectively. See 
Abdul Rahman Al-Rashed, With Chechnya and Tibet in Mind, AL ARABIYA 
(Oct. 3, 2012), http://www.alarabiya.net/views/2012/10/03/241553.html. De-
spite the personal popularity for the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan cause in 
many Western States, China’s rising importance has ensured that the issue 
has slipped off the international agenda. See Kim Arora, ‘Dalai Lama’s Popu-
larity Is Key to Tibet Cause,’ TIMES OF INDIA (Mar. 12, 2011), 
http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-03-
12/india/28683445_1_kalon-tripa-karmapa-lama-tibetans. 
 171. Once sensitive to criticism over Tiananmen Square, which threatened 
to disrupt its bid to join the WTO, China is now dismissive and even con-
temptuous of U.S. criticism on subjects ranging from China’s border disputes 
with its neighbors to its support of Syria. See, e.g., Barbara Demick, Clinton 
Draws Criticism from Chinese Ahead of Talks, L.A. TIMES BLOG (Sept. 4, 
2012, 11:00 AM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/world_now/2012/09/clinton-
draws-criticism-from-chinese-ahead-of-talks.html; Steven Lee Myers & Jane 
Perlez, Smiles and Barbs for Clinton in China, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 4, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/05/world/asia/a-harsh-reception-for-clinton-
in-chinas-state-media.html; Clinton’s Criticism over Syria Is Unacceptable, 
XINHUANET (July 7, 2012), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-
07/07/c_131701262.htm. 
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Even so, unless the ruler has egregious criminal tenden-
cies,172 he will be responsive to shaming on a scale that varies 
from weakly responsive to strongly responsive. If the ruler en-
joys widespread domestic support and has a weak opposition,173 
or is a dictator without any resistance, he will be weakly re-
sponsive to shaming at best. Similarly, if the ruler thrives on 
challenging the dominant international structure or is leading 
a revolutionary government fighting against claimed injustices 
perpetrated by foreign actors, shame has little chance of suc-
ceeding unless members of that state’s shaming reference 
                                                                                                             
 172. Examples of this type of ruler include Idi Amin of Uganda and Pol Pot 
of Cambodia. Idi Amin’s rule has been described as “a synonym for barbari-
ty,” and Amin himself as “possess[ing] a kind of animal magnetism,” which 
he wielded “with sadistic skill.” Patrick Keatley, Obituary: Idi Amin, 
GUARDIAN (Aug. 17, 2003), 
http://www.theguardian.com/news/2003/aug/18/guardianobituaries/print. 
Amin attributed God-like powers to himself and exhibited such irrational 
behavior that some foreign leaders who had contact with him came to con-
clude that he was “a dangerous, unbalanced man.” Id. Amin was ruthless in 
dealing with real and imagined political opposition, and his reign caused the 
deaths of an estimated 300,000 people, id., for often erratic reasons and via 
sadistic methods such as beating them to death with sledge hammers. See 
Death of a Buffoon and Killer, SCOTSMAN (Aug. 17, 2003), 
http://www.scotsman.com/news/international/death-of-a-despot-buffoon-and-
killer-1-1292740. Pol Pot, who ruled Cambodia from 1975–1979 as leader of 
the Khmer Rouge, went so far in his effort to force Cambodia into his idea of 
a Communist country as to kill all intellectuals, a term so widely interpreted 
at times as to include anyone who wore glasses or spoke a foreign language. 
Pol Pot: Life of a Tyrant, BBC NEWS (Apr. 14, 2000), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/78988.stm. His many ill-conceived poli-
cies, which included emptying all urban areas and forcing Cambodians to 
continually use the pronoun “we” instead of “I,” resulted in the deaths of up 
to 25% of the population. Pol Pot’s Cambodia: A Dark Century’s Blackest 
Cloud, ECONOMIST (Nov. 4, 2004), http://www.economist.com/node/3352737. 
 173. Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe provides a helpful example. Support for 
Mugabe’s chief opposition, the Movement for Democratic Change (“MDC”), 
fell from 38% in 2010 to only 20% in mid-2012. Lydia Polgreen, Less Support 
for Opposition in Zimbabwe, Study Shows, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2012, at A10. 
The MDC has faced many challenges, including attempting to pacify a di-
verse supporting base of its own and a leadership weakened by treason accu-
sations and Mugabe’s populist policies, such as accelerated land redistribu-
tion. CHRIS MAROLENG, SITUATION REPORT: ZIMBABWE’S MOVEMENT FOR 
DEMOCRATIC CHANGE: BRIEFING NOTES 2–4 (2004), available at 
http://dspace.cigilibrary.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/31353/1/ZIMMAY04.p
df. 
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group participate.174 To the contrary, shaming by dominant in-
ternational actors in such cases serves to establish that ruler’s 
reputation for fearlessness and in some cases can be effectively 
utilized to buttress his or her position amongst his domestic 
constituency.175 
This sort of impotency can have disturbing consequences. 
Perversely, the international community’s attempts at punish-
ing those who violate international norms might bring to power 
the very sorts of rulers who have the greatest tendency to vio-
late those norms. A state’s population might elect individuals 
they perceive to be most hostile to a dominant power that is a 
proponent of such IL norms in an attempt to signal resistance, 
and shaming in such circumstances becomes counterproduc-
tive. One example of this is the case of former Chancellor 
Schroeder of Germany, who was trailing in opinion polls before 
masterfully employing his opposition to U.S. policies in Iraq to 
stage a stunning victory.176 
                                                                                                             
 174. Slobodan Milosevic, for example, always positioned himself as the de-
fender of the Serbian people against foreign aggression. See Wife Hails Mi-
losevic the ‘Freedom Fighter,’ BBC NEWS (Sept. 7, 2001), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1529200.stm. In a 2001 BBC interview fol-
lowing his extradition to face war crimes charges at The Hague, Milosevic’s 
wife Mira Markovic proclaimed, “I don’t feel any shame. On the contrary, I’m 
proud of my people and I am sure that throughout its history it pursued—as 
far as wars are concerned—a defence policy.” Id. Mrs. Markovic blamed 
Western powers for the bloodshed in the former Yugoslavia and claimed that 
Mr. Milosevic was an inspiration to “many poor, small and humiliated na-
tions throughout the world.” Id. Milosevic himself phoned Fox News from his 
cell to give a live interview where he stated, “I’m proud for everything I did in 
defending my country and my people.” Milosevic Gives TV Interview from 
Cell, BBC NEWS (Aug. 24, 2001), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1507660.stm. 
 175. The most recent example of this is Mr. Hugo Chavez, the former presi-
dent of Venezuela, who made his global reputation almost entirely on being 
anti-United States. He seems to have profited from this reputation, and U.S. 
attempts at shaming were impotent when applied to him. Another example is 
Mr. Ahmedinejad of Iran. See generally sources cited and accompanying text 
supra note 168. 
 176. Dan Collins, Schroeder Claims Narrow Victory, CBS (Feb. 11, 2009), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-202_162-522699.html; John F. Dickerson, Why 
Bush Is Giving Schroeder the Cold Shoulder, TIME (Sept. 30, 2002), 
http://content.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,356168,00.html; Steven 
Komarow, Schroeder Sticks to Opposing War with Iraq, USA TODAY (Sept. 23, 
2002), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/2002-09-23-
germany_x.htm#. 
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Notwithstanding these features, shaming at the regime level 
offers valuable insights. Burma offers a helpful case study. Un-
til 1988, Burma was ruled under a one-party military-socialist 
system.177 In the wake of political upheaval that year, General 
Saw Maung seized power and formed a ruling council that im-
plemented a capitalist society, albeit under military control.178 
In 1990, Saw Maung held elections in which the National 
League for Democracy (“NLD”) took roughly 80% of all contest-
ed seats.179 Following this unexpected electoral outcome, the 
military refused to cede power180 and placed the NLD’s Gen-
eral-Secretary, Aung San Su Kyii, under house arrest.181 Over 
the next twenty years, the ruling military junta was accused of 
a host “of grave violations of basic human rights including 
forced labor, the use of child soldiers, forced relocation, sum-
mary executions, torture and the rape of women and girls, par-
ticularly of members of ethnic minorities.”182 
From 1991, the UNGA passed a steady stream of resolutions 
on Burma, mainly focused on addressing democratization, hu-
man rights, and the release of political prisoners. Although 
these resolutions often employed “soft” diplomatic terms, such 
as the expression “of grave concern,”183 there were also exam-
ples of language that was clearly pejorative and expressive of a 
                                                                                                             
 177. C.L. Lim, From Constructive Engagement to Collective Revulsion: The 
Myanmar Precedent of 2007, 26 SING. L. REV. 204, 206–07 (2008). 
 178. Id. at 208. It was around this time that the country was officially re-
named “Myanmar.” Burma Takes Another Name: Now, the Union of Myan-
mar, N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 1989), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1989/06/20/world/burma-takes-another-name-now-
the-union-of-myanmar.html. 
 179. Lim, supra note 177, at 208. 
 180. Id. at 208–09. 
 181. Aung San Suu Kyi, BIOGRAPHY.COM, 
http://www.biography.com/people/aung-san-suu-kyi-9192617 (last visited 
Nov. 4, 2013). 
 182. Michael Ewing-Chow, First Do No Harm: Myanmar Trade Sanctions 
and Human Rights, 5 NW. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 153, 155 (2007). 
 183. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 66/230, ¶¶ 1, 9, 21 U.N. Doc. A/RES/66/230 (Dec. 24, 
2011); G.A. Res. 61/232, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/232 (Dec. 22, 2006); G.A. 
Res. 60/233, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/233 (Dec. 23, 2005); G.A. Res. 59/263, ¶ 
2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/59/263 (Dec. 23, 2004); G.A. Res. 58/247, ¶¶ 2, 3, U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/58/247 (Dec. 23, 2003); G.A. Res. 57/231, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/57/231 (Dec. 18, 2002); G.A. Res. 47/144, U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/144 
(Dec. 18, 1992); G.A. Res. 46/132, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/46/132 (Dec. 17, 
1991). 
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value judgment regarding the junta’s conduct, such as “con-
demning” or “deploring” their actions.184 For instance, UNGA 
Resolution 56/231, adopted in 2001, “[d]eplor[ing] the contin-
ued violations of human rights in Myanmar, including extraju-
dicial, summary or arbitrary executions, enforced disappear-
ances, rape, torture, inhuman treatment, forced labour, includ-
ing the use of children, forced relocation and denial of freedom 
of assembly, association, expression, religion and movement.”185 
Other international organizations also repeatedly condemned 
human rights abuses in Burma,186 with the International La-
bour Organization (“ILO”) going so far as to “urge” its members 
in late 2000 to impose sanctions on Burma unless it improved 
its track record on forced labor.187 This ultimatum, yielded re-
sults: Burma “allowed the ILO to open an office in [its territo-
ry] in 2002” and agreed on a plan of action to end forced la-
                                                                                                             
 184. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 65/241, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/65/241 (Dec. 24, 2010); 
G.A. Res. 64/238, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/64/238 (Dec. 24, 2009); G.A. Res. 
63/245, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/245 (Dec. 24, 2008); G.A. Res. 62/222, ¶ 1, 
U.N. Doc. A/RES/62/222 (Dec. 22, 2007); G.A. Res. 56/231, ¶¶ 4, 18, 20, 22, 
U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/231 (Dec. 24, 2001); G.A. Res. 55/112, ¶¶ 4, 14, 16, 18, 
U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/112 (Dec. 4, 2000); G.A. Res. 54/186, ¶¶ 5, 13, 14, U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/54/186 (Dec. 17, 1999); G.A. Res. 53/162, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/53/162 (Dec. 9, 1998); G.A. Res. 52/137, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/52/137 
(Dec. 12, 1997); G.A. Res. 51/117, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/51/117 (Dec. 12, 
1996); G.A. Res. 50/194, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/50/194 (Dec. 22, 1995); G.A. 
Res. 49/197, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/49/197 (Dec. 23, 1994); G.A. Res. 48/150, ¶ 
2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/150 (Dec. 20, 1993). 
 185. G.A. Res. 56/231, supra note 184, ¶ 4. The resolution also stated that 
the UNGA “[d]eplores  the continued violations of human rights, in particular 
those directed against persons belonging to ethnic and religious minorities, 
including summary executions, rape, torture, forced labour, forced porterage, 
forced relocations, use of anti-personnel landmines, destruction of crops and 
fields and dispossession of land and property.” Id. ¶ 18. 
 186. See, e.g., E.S.C. Dec. 1998/261, U.N. Doc. E/DEC/1998/98 (July 30, 
1998); U.N. Comm’n on Human Rights, Human Rights Res. 1997/64, ¶ 2, 
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/1997/64 (Apr. 16, 1997); E.S.C. Dec. 1994/269, U.N. 
Doc. E/DEC/1994/94 (July 25, 1994); U.N. Comm’n on Human Rights, Human 
Rights Res. 1994/85, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/1994/84 (Mar. 9, 1994); U.N. 
Comm’n on Human Rights, Human Rights Res. 1992/58, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/RES/1992/58 (Mar. 3, 1992); see generally Special Rapporteur on the 
Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar, Situation of Human Rights in My-
anmar, Comm’n on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/70 (Jan. 15, 1998) 
(by Rajsoomer Lallah). 
 187. Thihan Myo Nyun, Feeling Good or Doing Good: Inefficacy of the U.S. 
Unilateral Sanctions Against the Military Government of Burma/Myanmar, 7 
WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 455, 478 n.97 (2008). 
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bor.188 The World Bank also sought to put pressure on the junta 
by cutting off lending to Burma and tying any minor loans to a 
willingness to institute reforms.189 
Individual states also took action against the regime. The ini-
tial sanctions, which were put in place between 1988 and 1990, 
were explicitly linked to violations of internationally recognized 
workers’ rights and drug trafficking laws.190 Despite several 
attempts to formulate legislation imposing tougher sanctions 
(e.g., the failed 1995 Free Burma Act),191 comprehensive legis-
lation on this point was only passed in 2003 in the form of the 
Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act, 2003 (“BFDA”), which 
banned imports from Burma/Myanmar,192 froze assets of top 
officials,193 and prohibited granting them visas.194 It also man-
dated that the United States block “soft loans” to Burma at the 
IMF and World Bank.195 
In contrast to other U.S. domestic sanction legislation, the 
provisions of the BFDA have never been waived. The legisla-
tion was put in force indefinitely and cannot be repealed until 
“measurable and substantial progress” has been made on pre-
venting internationally recognized human rights violations 
(such as forced labor, the conscription of child soldiers, and 
rape), forming a democratic government, releasing all political 
prisoners, and improving the protection of freedom of speech, 
freedom of the press, freedom of association, and freedom of 
religion.196 Further, the Burmese junta must reach a peaceful 
settlement with the NLD, other democratic forces, and Burma’s 
ethnic minorities.197 
The EU worked in tandem with the United States on the is-
sue of Burma, imposing an arms embargo and refusing all aid 
                                                                                                             
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. at 477–78. 
 190. Id. 
 191. See H.R. 2892, 104th Cong. (1996). 
 192. Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-61, § 3, 
117 Stat. 864, 865–66 (2003) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1701 
(2000)). 
 193. § 4, 117 Stat. at 867. 
 194. § 6, 117 Stat. at 867. 
 195. § 5, 117 Stat. at 867. 
 196. § 3(A)–(B), 117 Stat. at 866. See also Ewing-Chow, supra note 182, at 
157–58. 
 197. § 3(B)(v), 117 Stat. at 866. 
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except for humanitarian assistance.198 In 1996, the EU adopted 
a Common Position on Myanmar, which also introduced a visa 
ban for senior Burmese officials, 199  and in 1997, further 
strengthened its sanctions by suspending Burma from the GSP 
program.200 In 2000, the EU imposed a freeze on assets held 
abroad by persons related to the Burmese government. 201 
Shaming by the United States and EU has come at severe eco-
nomic cost to Burma: as a Least Developed Country (a status it 
has “enjoyed” since 1987), Burma would otherwise be entitled 
to (and, of course, in need of) significant financial assistance.202 
While the West took coercive steps, Burma’s neighbors, act-
ing through the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(“ASEAN”), preferred what they termed “constructive engage-
ment”—a method of encouraging reform in Burma in a less con-
frontational manner. 203  However there was an element of 
shame even here: in 2006, the year that Myanmar would have 
been entitled to chair ASEAN, the other members convinced 
the junta to waive that right.204 In the Burmese face-based cul-
ture, this has massive shame implications.205 
The evidence seems to support the view that shaming was 
not especially effective until 2007, when the junta’s repressive 
crackdowns on the “Saffron Revolution” led by Buddhist monks 
brought renewed attention206 and strong criticism from inter-
                                                                                                             
 198. Council Common Position (EC) No. 96/635 of 28 Oct. 1996, art. 5(a)(ii), 
1996 O.J. (L 287) 1, 2 (these measures were reaffirmed to as they were “al-
ready adopted”). 
 199. Id. art. 2(b)(i). 
 200. EU/Burma: Council Suspends Industrial and Agricultural GSP Bene-
fits, EUROPOLITICS (Mar. 26, 1997), http://www.europolitics.info/eu-burma-
council-suspends-industrial-and-agricultural-gsp-benefits-artr166176-
75.html. 
 201. Ewing-Chow, supra note 182, at 159. 
 202. See id. at 154. 
 203. Lim, supra note 177, at 209. 
 204. Id. at 211. 
 205. See generally David Yau-Fi Ho, On the Concept of Face, 81 AM. J. SOC. 
867 (1998) (discussing the concept of face in general); Joo Yup Kim & Sang 
Hoon Nam, The Concept and Dynamics of Face: Implications for Organiza-
tional Behavior in Asia, 9 ORG. SCI. 522, 523 (1998) (discussing how the con-
cept of face explains behavior in many Asian cultures). 
 206. The immediate result was widespread news coverage. See, e.g., Andrew 
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national figures. In 2008, Laura Bush, then First Lady of the 
United States, called the violent crackdown on democracy pro-
testors in Burma a “shameful response,”207 while Secretary of 
State Condoleezza Rice condemned the military junta as “‘one 
of the worst regimes in the world’ for its record on human 
rights and free speech.”208 Significantly, ASEAN stopped its 
face-saving efforts with Burma and expressed in no uncertain 
terms “revulsion” at the repression of protests.209 This term 
“revulsion” appears to be the strongest language ever officially 
used in relation to the situation in Burma. 
While a Security Council Resolution calling on Burma’s gov-
ernment to stop military attacks against civilians in ethnic mi-
nority regions and transition to democracy was vetoed by Chi-
na and Russia in 2007,210 attention continued to focus on Bur-
ma throughout 2008 at the U.N. when Human Rights Council 
Resolution 7/31 expressed “deep concern” at the violent repres-
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tion, U.N. Press Release SC/8939 (Jan. 12, 2007), 
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tributed to internal concerns in Russia and China in regards to Chechnya 
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AL ARABIYA (Oct. 3, 2012), 
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sion of protests211 and “[s]trongly deplore[d] the ongoing sys-
tematic violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms 
of the people of Myanmar.”212 It also urged the government of 
Burma to receive a Special Rapporteur.213 The report of one of 
the Rapporteurs, issued a few months later, focused on viola-
tions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, such as 
Article 19 (freedom of expression).214 The report also considered 
Articles 9, 10, 11, 19, 20, and 21 of the Universal Declaration to 
be implicated in the case of Aung San Suu Kyi,215 and found 
that the excessive use of force to quell protests in September 
2007 (which, according to the report, led to thirty-one deaths) 
contravened Article 29(2) and (3) of the Universal Declara-
tion.216 The report also estimated the number of political pris-
oners to be 1,900.217 
The ruling junta was not impervious to shaming. It reacted 
periodically in predictable ways. On October 24, 2007, the day 
after the U.N. humanitarian coordinator in Burma, Charles 
Petrie, released a statement critical of the junta’s handling of 
the protests, the Burmese Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a 
protest note. 218  The note stated that “the United Nations 
statement was ‘unprecedented’ and ‘very negative’ and com-
plained that Myanmar officials were not notified in advance of 
its publication.”219 Shortly thereafter, on November 2, the junta 
ordered Petrie’s expulsion from the country. 220 In a letter dated 
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November 5, 2007 and addressed to the U.N. Secretary-
General, the government attacked the shamers: 
countries that initiated the draft resolution . . . did so only to 
channel the domestic political process in the direction of their 
choosing and not to promote human rights per se . . . There 
should be no double standards or politicization of human 
rights issues.221 
The letter blamed the “relentless negative media campaign” for 
Burma becoming “an emotive issue” and attacked the veracity 
of claims concerning human rights violations. 222  It outlined 
several areas of progress achieved by Burma in cooperation 
with the ILO, attempting to create a reputation as a cooperator 
state. 223  In reaction to UNGA Resolution 65/241, 224  Burma 
“appreciated those that had voted against the text despite the 
serious pressure and threats imposed by some States. Still, the 
‘heavy-handed approach’ used by some countries had made it 
difficult for many delegations to vote against the ill-thought-
out resolution.”225 Similarly, in response to UNGA Resolution 
60/233,226 Burma’s representative “categorically reject[ed] the 
allegations and accusations.”227 
Burma’s leaders were, moreover, not merely subject to sham-
ing directed from other states. The cause of the NLD had long 
been a popular one in the public consciousness of many West-
ern nations.228 As a result, the junta occasionally found itself 
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targeted by shaming actions from private pressure groups.229 
Realizing that the junta may not be responsive, these groups 
engaged in secondary shaming against Western companies for 
“doing business” with Burma.230 
In 2004, the Burma Campaign UK published the names of 
thirty-seven companies transacting business with Burma in an 
action referred to in the press as “naming and shaming,” with 
those on it reportedly belonging to “a dirty list.” 231  Those 
named included several high-profile companies, 
includ[ing] Rolls Royce, . . . Lloyds of London, . . . and SWIFT, 
the financial messaging network partly owned by British 
firms. . . . Tony Blair [then-Prime Minister of the U.K.] . . . 
urged British companies to boycott Burma voluntarily, point-
ing to the suppression of democracy, human rights abuses, 
the use of forced labour and the oppression of minorities.232 
These tactics had some success, persuading “at least twenty 
firms—most notably British American Tobacco—to exit Bur-
ma” in 2004.233 The military junta was thus not only subjected 
to direct shaming actions, but was also susceptible to others 
refusing to have dealings with them because of shame directed 
at those third parties. This is an example of effective secondary 
shaming, in which high social and economic costs deter third 
parties from cooperating with a norm violator, thus isolating 
the norm violator and discouraging third parties from engaging 
in similar behavior.   
Until recently, however, the effect of such sanctions remained 
uncertain. When U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon visited 
Burma in mid-2009, the ruling council refused to allow a meet-
ing with the opposition leader. 234 Ki-Moon did, however, pro-
cure a pledge from Senior General Than Shwe that elections 
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would be held in 2010 and that they would be “free and fair.”235 
According to Ki-Moon’s report, “[t]he Government intended to 
implement all appropriate recommendations proposed by the 
Secretary-General, including on such matters as amnesty for 
prisoners and technical assistance for the elections.” 236 Reac-
tion to this report within the Security Council was mixed, alt-
hough the vast majority of statements reflected a strong feeling 
that Burma should comply with the U.N.’s requests. 237 Several 
powerful states, including the U.K. and France, sent a clear 
message that their impatience with Burma was increasing and 
that if reforms did not materialize “the international communi-
ty must react firmly.” 238  Resolution 64/238, which followed 
about five months after Ki-Moon’s visit, was even more critical 
in its language than previous resolutions had been: “The Gen-
eral Assembly . . . strongly condemns the ongoing systematic 
violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms of the 
people of Myanmar.”239 
Whether owing to the international pressure, or for other 
reasons, the junta decided to hold elections in 2010.240 Presi-
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dent Thein Sein (a former military commander) was elected 
and proceeded to usher in a period of political liberalization, 
freeing Aung San Suu Kyi,241 releasing a number of political 
prisoners,242 and relaxing censorship laws.243 As a reward for 
this behavior, U.S. Secretary of State Hilary Clinton visited the 
country in December 2011.244 Shortly after Clinton’s visit, ap-
proximately 600 political prisoners were released from Bur-
mese jails and a peace agreement was signed with the Karen 
ethnic group.245 In 2012, a by-election was held for forty-five 
parliamentary seats, forty-three of which were won by the 
NLD, including a seat for Suu Kyi, who entered parliament on 
May 2, 2012.246  Simultaneously, the United States loosened 
some of its restrictions on investment in Burma,247 while the 
EU instituted a temporary lift on sanctions.248 
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The release of Aung San Suu Kyi and other political prison-
ers from arrest, as well as their ability to travel, significantly 
influenced a major point of Western policy on Burma for over 
twenty years. In September 2012, Suu Kyi made a historic visit 
to Western Europe and the United States, collecting several 
important human rights prizes that had been awarded to her 
in absentia.249 Concurrent to her visit, Burma announced the 
release of some 500 political prisoners on humanitarian 
grounds.250 These actions prompted the EU to consider rein-
stating Burma’s preferential trading status.251 Suu Kyi’s visit 
to the United States coincided with President Thein Sein’s visit 
to the U.N. Headquarters in New York in September 2012.252 
Asked whether the government was afraid of being upstaged by 
Suu Kyi, Minister Aung Min reportedly replied that the gov-
ernment was not worried about the attention devoted to Suu 
Kyi and that they were “very proud” of her work.253 The minis-
ter then compared Burma to post-apartheid South Africa, with 
Suu Kyi playing the role of Mandela and the current Burmese 
government playing the role of the South African de Klerk gov-
ernment. 254  Two days prior to these comments, the United 
States had agreed to lift measures that blocked Burma’s presi-
dent and the speaker of its lower house of parliament from 
holding U.S. assets.255 
Relations appeared to be improving further still as U.S. Pres-
ident Obama visited Burma in November 2012. 256  During 
Obama’s visit, President Thein Sein showed certain sensitivity 
to issues of national pride and shame, specifically speaking of 
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the relationship between the United States and Burma as be-
ing “based on mutual . . . respect” and stating that human 
rights in Burma would have “to be aligned with international 
standards.”257 The Obama administration showed considerable 
recognition of the cultural importance attached to saving face 
during the president’s visit, and decided to “soften the blow” on 
the junta’s pride by undertaking such actions of demonstrative 
respect as visiting important Burmese cultural and religious 
sites.258 This stance has been reinforced by other actors within 
the U.S. political decision-making process, which indicate that 
these actors also recognize the importance of shaming/non-
shaming behavior in encouraging IL compliance. Then House 
Minority Leader and previous sponsor of sanctions on Burma, 
Mitch McConnell, announced in May 2013 that he would not 
seek the renewal of sanctions on Burma as it “would be a slap 
in the face to Burmese reformers.”259 
By making it apparent that compliance with international 
standards will not set off a further round of shame and con-
demnation but that non-compliance would, the administration 
has succeeded in wielding shame as an enforcement measure to 
significant effect. As a result, positive steps continue to be tak-
en in relation to Burma’s compliance with international human 
rights standards, including Thein Sein’s visit to the U.K. in Ju-
ly 2013, during which he met with Prime Minister David Cam-
eron and pledged that “by the end of this year, there will be no 
prisoners of conscience in Myanmar.”260 
Thus, while far from ideal, the situation in Burma has un-
dergone a dramatic change in the past four years and the goals 
that were set by the shaming sanctions (release of political 
prisoners, elections, peace with ethnic rebels) have largely 
borne fruit. What is more, it can be observed that these chang-
es have been brought about in a carefully calibrated lockstep 
with the easing of sanctions against the nation. 
                                                                                                             
 257. Id. 
 258. See id. 
 259. James Rowley & Daniel Ten Kate, Myanmar Sanctions Won’t Be Ex-
tended, McConnell Says, BLOOMBERG (May 22, 2013), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-05-21/myanmar-sanctions-won-t-be-
extended-mcconnell-says.html (emphasis added). 
 260. Andrew Woodcock, No More Political Prisoners: Myanmar, AUSTRALIAN 
(July 16, 2013), http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/latest-news/no-more-
political-prisoners-myanmar/story-fn3dxix6-1226679907770. 
122 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 39:1 
D. Enforcement of Shaming Sanctions 
Critics who argue that IL is not real law emphasize the lack 
of centralized machinery for its enforcement. They set out IL in 
marked contrast to domestic law, where the legal system pro-
vides policemen, courts, and prisons to enforce the law and 
mete out punishment. The enforcement machinery problem 
does not disappear merely because we are dealing with sham-
ing rather than other types of coercive sanctions. Even in do-
mestic criminal law, shaming is closely aligned to the court 
system and is imposed after a judicial finding of responsibility 
for the wrong. When transposed into the IL context, the ab-
sence of a court with universal jurisdiction creates difficulties 
because there are no agencies with authority to make determi-
nations of responsibility that satisfy the requirements of au-
thority, neutrality, and legitimacy. But this fails to tell the en-
tire story. 
1. International Organizations 
The absence of a world court system with binding adjudica-
tive power does not mean that there is no adequate enforce-
ment mechanism for shaming. International Organizations 
(“IOs”) are capable of performing the adjudicative function to a 
degree sufficient to meet the requirements of authority, neu-
trality, and fairness. The U.N. offers a complex example. 
The consequences of the U.N. employing shame sanctions are 
likely to be different, depending on whether the enforcer is the 
Security Council or the UNGA. Given that the UNGA is com-
prised of all the nations of the world with equal voting power, 
which is usually deployed in a partisan manner,261 it is unlikely 
that there will be agreement on anything but the most egre-
gious violations of international law. In addition, the presence 
of a significant number of countries with unelected leaders also 
makes it unlikely that many acts that would be regarded as 
shameful by liberal democracies will be so viewed by countries 
ruled by such individuals. Even when such states participate in 
shaming, it might be disingenuous or even hypocritical, and a 
means to uphold the appearance of conforming to international 
norms. 
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Despite these problems, the UNGA does engage in shaming, 
although this might only provide a weak constraint on states. If 
the Security Council engages in shaming, the net effect is un-
likely to be much better because of the veto power enjoyed by 
the permanent members.262 Recent examples, such as the diffi-
culty in imposing sanctions on Iran due to opposition from Chi-
na and Russia,263 suggest that the Security Council may not be 
particularly well suited to impose shame sanctions except for 
the most egregious violations involving states bereft of super-
power support. 
Aside from the U.N., states have membership in a number of 
other small and large international organizations. Membership 
in these IOs commits states to engage in cooperative activities 
within a defined legal framework, which is typically provided 
by the constitution of the IO.264 There is well-developed schol-
arship showing the cooperative benefits of membership that is 
of salience for shaming. For example, Robert Axelrod writes 
that, “[i]f the players can observe each other interacting with 
others, they can develop reputations; and the existence of repu-
tations can lead to a world characterized by efforts to deter bul-
lies.”265 
Shaming by IOs follows similar contours. Their constitutional 
documents set out a mission and organizational goals,266 and 
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repeated interactions between member states enable the crea-
tion of reputations about whether states meet those goals. If a 
state acquires a reputation as an offender, other states and the 
IO’s executive machinery can impose shame sanctions in in-
crements ranging from cautionary warnings to expulsion from 
membership.267 In some cases, a state that is targeted for sanc-
tions might relinquish membership rather than face expulsion 
to deflect shame. In 2003, for example, Zimbabwe quit its 
membership of the Commonwealth after a decision to suspend 
its membership (initially made in 2002) was maintained indef-
initely as a response to the nation’s unfair elections.268 
Shaming at the IO level also includes adjudicative tribunals 
set up by treaty regimes. The proliferation of such tribunals, 
such as those in the international investment law area, means 
that some of the process-type objections advanced against 
                                                                                                             
(f) Promote peace, security, and stability on the continent; 
(g) Promote democratic principles and institutions, popular partici-
pation and good governance; 
(h) Promote and protect human and peoples’ rights in accordance 
with the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and other 
relevant human rights instruments; 
(i) Establish the necessary conditions which enable the continent to 
play its rightful role in the global economy and in international ne-
gotiations; 
(j) Promote sustainable development at the economic, social and cul-
tural levels as well as the integration of African economies; 
(k) Promote co-operation in all fields of human activity to raise the 
living standards of African peoples; 
(l) Coordinate and harmonize the policies between the existing and 
future Regional Economic Communities for the gradual attainment 
of the objectives of the Union; 
(m) Advance the development of the continent by promoting re-
search in all fields, in particular in science and technology; 
(n) Work with relevant international partners in the eradication of 
preventable diseases and the promotion of good health on the conti-
nent. 
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shaming have much less bite.269 These tribunals have authority 
delegated by states via bilateral or multilateral treaties and 
are required to follow formal legal processes analogous to do-
mestic tribunals.270 They have the ability to make the neces-
sary findings of fact antecedent to shaming. 
2. States 
States are likely to be the principal enforcers of shame sanc-
tions. Given the opportunities for repeated interactions in an 
interdependent world, evaluative opinions by a state about an-
other state’s derogation from IL norms is important. Not only 
does it matter to the two states, but it also matters to third-
party states because it reinforces the norm and conveys infor-
mation about the desirability of the offender state as a coopera-
tive partner. 
States regularly make evaluative opinions about other states. 
Some have the resources to make elaborate justifications and 
provide evidence for those opinions in a legal manner. One ex-
ample is the U.S. State Department’s annual human rights re-
ports. These reports have received harsh criticism as being par-
tisan.271 As acknowledged by Professor Kahan in a recantation 
from his earlier position, partisanship is a major problem for 
shaming.272 The United States has also been accused of hypoc-
risy.273 Attacks based on the lack of neutrality and credibility to 
                                                                                                             
 269. See Jason Yackee, Controlling the International Investment Law Agen-
cy, 53 HARV. INT’L L.J. 391, 392 (2012). 
 270. See, e.g., The Tribunal, INT’L TRIBUNAL ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, 
http://www.itlos.org/index.php?id=15&L=0 (last visited Nov. 8, 2013). 
 271. See George Gedda, After Abu Ghraib: The U.S. Human Rights Agenda, 
81 FOREIGN SERVICE J. 48 (2004). Gedda noted that William Schulz, executive 
director of Amnesty International USA, remarked on 
the occasion of the February release of the State Department’s an-
nual human rights report . . . : “The content of this report has little 
correspondence with the administration’s foreign policy; indeed, the 
U.S. is increasingly guilty of a ‘sincerity gap,’ overlooking abuses by 
allies and justifying action against foes by post-facto references to 
human rights. In response, many foreign governments will choose to 
blunt criticism of their abuses by increasing cooperation with the 
U.S. war on terror rather than by improving human rights.” 
Id. 
 272. Alternative Sanctions, supra note 5, at 2076. 
 273. The Los Angeles Times wrote in conjunction with a diplomatic offen-
sive by the Bush administration in Argentina: 
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engage in shaming are severely debilitating and suggest that 
neutrality, or a perception thereof, is important if shaming 
sanctions are to work. 
This is not to say that shaming by individual states should be 
ignored altogether. Some states will be persuaded by the U.S. 
State Department’s reports, and it must ultimately fall to a 
process of reinforcement by validation to determine if the state 
being shamed is indeed deserving of punishment. There is 
nothing stopping Iran and Venezuela from issuing shaming re-
ports of their own. If members of the international community 
believe these reports are the products of serious investigation 
and research, they will be credible. On the other hand, if they 
are merely propaganda, they are likely to be ignored. While 
Kahan’s criticisms regarding partisanship may have some sali-
ence in the criminal law due to the existence of incarceration as 
a viable alternative, the absence of better alternatives in IL 
means that shaming has currency despite these difficulties. 
3. Domestic Enforcement of IL 
a. Domestic Courts 
The gap in enforcement caused by the absence of a world 
court system with binding jurisdiction can be bridged by do-
mestic courts. While sovereign states can claim that they are 
not subservient to foreign courts, the same claim cannot be 
held about the state’s own domestic courts. If, as a growing 
body of case law shows, domestic courts enforce IL norms 
against their governments, the criticism about IL lacking coer-
cive enforcement recedes. 
With regards to shaming being the coercive sanction for the 
enforcement of IL, the criticism about the absence of an adjudi-
cative agency to make a finding of responsibility loses sting. 
Critics might still argue that domestic courts are not sufficient-
                                                                                                             
Critics were quick to assail Washington’s human rights record, citing 
abuses at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq and at the U.S. detention 
center in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. 
All have fanned anti-U.S. sentiment in a region where Washington’s 
previous interventions and alliances with military dictatorships re-
main fresh in the collective memory. 
Patrick J. McDonnell, Latin America Wary of New U.S. Attention, L.A. TIMES 
(Feb. 12, 2007), http://articles.latimes.com/2007/feb/12/world/fg-soamerica12. 
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ly neutral adjudicators against their own governments because 
they are but organs of the same government. This objection is 
objectively refutable. Because the adjudication is public and 
observable, and follows the processes typical of judicial dispute 
resolution, neutrality can be assessed in the same way as is 
standard for purely domestic adjudication where the govern-
ment is frequently a litigant. Moreover, judges and lawyers are 
obligated to follow the same rules in cases involving the appli-
cation of IL rules against the home state as they are required 
to do in domestic cases. If these checks are sufficient for domes-
tic adjudication to satisfy the test of neutrality and procedural 
fairness in order to be legitimate and credible, surely the same 
principle applies when the case involves the application of IL 
rules. 
The domestic enforcement of IL rules shows that shaming is 
effective—not by judges intervening in foreign policy decisions 
or by compelling the state to act against its self-interest, but by 
enforcing IL norms on a domestic level and employing “sham-
ing”-idealistic language when referencing such IL norms. This 
serves to bring the government behavior into compliance with 
those norms. Some examples are presented below. 
1. United States 
Despite political opposition and criticism from many quar-
ters, U.S. courts have referenced IL norms in a number of re-
cent cases. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,274 the highest court in the 
United States stated, “We have long since made clear that a 
state of war is not a blank check for the President when it 
comes to the rights of the Nation’s citizens.”275 The U.S. Su-
preme Court bolstered this view with reference to the Geneva 
and Hague Conventions, stating, “It is a clearly established 
principle of the law of war that detention may last no longer 
than active hostilities,”276 unless the prisoner is either being 
                                                                                                             
 274. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
 275. Id. at 536 (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 
579, 587 (1952)). 
 276. “See Article 118 of the Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treat-
ment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, [1955] 6 U.S.T. 3316, 3406, T.I.A.S. 
No. 3364 (“Prisoners of war shall be released and repatriated without delay 
after the cessation of active hostilities”). See also Article 20 of the Hague 
Convention (II) on Laws and Customs of War on Land, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat 
1817 (as soon as possible after “conclusion of peace”); Hague Convention (IV), 
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lawfully prosecuted or serving a sentence resulting from such a 
prosecution.277 
The Court also used language that calls on moral norms: 
[I]t is . . . vital that our calculus not give short shrift to the 
values that this country holds dear or to the privilege that is 
American citizenship. It is during our most challenging and 
uncertain moments that our Nation’s commitment to due pro-
cess is most severely tested; and it is in those times that we 
must preserve our commitment at home to the principles for 
which we fight abroad.278 
The Court then included a similar quotation from United States 
v. Robel:279 “It would indeed be ironic if, in the name of national 
defense, we would sanction the subversion of one of those liber-
ties . . . which makes the defense of the Nation worthwhile.”280 
The Court was unwilling to cede ground to the government be-
cause of the limits of the separation of powers doctrine: 
[W]e necessarily reject the Government’s assertion that sepa-
ration of powers principles mandate a heavily circumscribed 
role for the courts in such circumstances. Indeed, the position 
that the courts must forgo any examination of the individual 
case and focus exclusively on the legality of the broader de-
tention scheme cannot be mandated by any reasonable view 
of separation of powers, as this approach serves only to con-
dense power into a single branch of government. . . . [U]nless 
Congress acts to suspend it, the Great Writ of habeas corpus 
allows the Judicial Branch to play a necessary role in main-
taining this delicate balance of governance, serving as an im-
portant judicial check on the Executive’s discretion in the 
realm of detentions. . . . [I]t would turn our system of checks 
and balances on its head to suggest that a citizen could not 
make his way to court with a challenge to the factual basis for 
                                                                                                             
supra, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat 2301 (“conclusion of peace” (Art. 20)); Geneva 
Convention, supra, July 27, 1929, 47 Stat 2055 (repatriation should be ac-
complished with the least possible delay after conclusion of peace (Art. 75)).” 
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 520. 
 277. Id. at 520–21 (citing Jordan J. Paust, Judicial Power to Determine the 
Status and Rights of Persons Detained Without Trial, 44 HARV. INT’L L.J. 503, 
510–11 (2003)). 
 278. Id. at 532. 
 279. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967). 
 280. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 532 (citing Robel, 389 U.S. at 264)). 
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his detention by his government, simply because the Execu-
tive opposes making available such a challenge.281 
In Boumediene v. Bush,282 the Court reiterated that 
[the Nation’s] basic charter cannot be contracted away like 
this. The Constitution grants Congress and the President the 
power to acquire, dispose of, and govern territory, not the 
power to decide when and where its terms apply. . . . To hold 
that the political branches have the power to switch the Con-
stitution on or off at will . . . [would lead to a regime in which 
they], not this Court, say “what the law is.”283 
In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,284 the U.S. Supreme Court made 
further extensive references to international treaties and 
mechanisms in its decision. 285  The U.S. government argued 
that the Geneva Conventions did not apply to the case because 
the conflict in question existed between the United States and 
al-Qaeda, rather than between the United States and Afghani-
stan.286 Since al-Qaeda was not a contracting party to the Ge-
neva Conventions, its members did not enjoy their protec-
tion.287 The Court did not feel compelled to pronounce on this 
question because 
there is at least one provision of the Geneva Conventions that 
applies here even if the relevant conflict is not one between 
signatories. Article 3 . . . provides that in a “conflict not of an 
international character occurring in the territory of one of the 
High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be 
bound to apply, as a minimum,” certain provisions protecting 
                                                                                                             
 281. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 535–37. 
 282. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008). The case was brought by 
“enemy combatants” being held at Guantanamo Bay. Id. at 732. All were non-
citizens of the United States who had filed a writ of habeas corpus. The Unit-
ed States’ Detainee Treatment Act and Military Commissions Act had stated 
that those held at Guantanamo Bay were not entitled to habeas corpus. Id. at 
734. The question before the Court was thus whether a constitutional guar-
antee of habeas corpus existed and extended to noncitizens. Id. at 732. The 
Court found that in cases where habeas corpus was denied an adequate al-
ternative had to be provided. Id. at 732–33. 
 283. Id. at 765 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803)). 
 284. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). This case concerned a Yem-
eni national captured in Afghanistan and held at Guantanamo Bay. Id. at 
566. 
 285. See id. at 628. 
 286. Id. at 629. 
 287. Id. 
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“[p]ersons taking no active part in the hostilities, including 
members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and 
those placed hors de combat by . . . detention.” . . . [It] prohib-
its “the passing of sentences and the carrying out of execu-
tions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly 
constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which 
are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.”288 
The Court considered the commentaries on the Geneva Con-
ventions and a treatise of the Red Cross289 to determine wheth-
er a military tribunal was a “regularly constituted court” as 
used in Common Article 3.290 
If Hamdi asserted judicial power in keeping executive power 
in check, Munaf v. Geren291 went in the opposite direction: the 
U.S. Supreme Court decided that whether or not individuals 
(in this case American citizens) could be transferred into Iraqi 
custody was a matter for the executive to decide.292 According 
to the Court, 
the [United States] explains that, although it remains con-
cerned about torture among some sectors of the Iraqi Gov-
ernment, the State Department has determined that the Jus-
tice Ministry—the department that would have authority over 
Munaf and Omar—as well as its prison and detention facili-
ties have “generally met internationally accepted standards 
for basic prisoner needs.” The Solicitor General explains that 
such determinations are based on “the Executive’s assessment 
of the foreign country’s legal system and . . . the Executive[‘s] 
. . . ability to obtain foreign assurances it considers reliable.” 
The Judiciary is not suited to second-guess such determina-
tions—determinations that would require federal courts to 
pass judgment on foreign justice systems and undermine the 
Government’s ability to speak with one voice in this area.293 
This is a retrograde decision for the shaming argument because 
the Court is restrained based upon a strict view of the separa-
                                                                                                             
 288. Id. at 629–30 (quoting Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of 
Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135). 
 289. JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, 1 CUSTOMARY 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: RULES (rev. ed. 2009). 
 290. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 631–32. 
 291. Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674 (2008). 
 292. Id. at 704–05. 
 293. Id. at 702 (citing Brief for Federal Parties at 47, Munaf, 553 U.S. 674 
(No. 06-1666); Reply Brief for Federal Parties at 23, Munaf, 553 U.S. 674 (No. 
06-1666)). 
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tion of powers doctrine. It defers because “the other branches 
possess significant diplomatic tools and leverage the judiciary 
lacks,”294 and because it does not see itself as a member of the 
shaming reference group. 
These cases together show the judiciary reaching for IL 
norms, not to enforce them in the way it would typically enforce 
a domestic law norm, but rather as an aspirational goal, the 
breach of which would entail shame and therefore mixed re-
sults. On balance, the U.S. courts have not embraced IL norms 
as readily as might have been expected by external audiences 
and thereby not gained the status as norm entrepreneurs that 
U.S. courts have enjoyed in constitutional law adjudication.  
2. The United Kingdom 
Case law from the U.K. also exhibits this tension between the 
executive and the judiciary, with the latter referring to foreign 
law and IL norms to hold the former in check. Once again, in 
the context of the war on terror, the recent case of Binyam Mo-
hamed 295  saw the Supreme Court using shaming language 
against an executive that had some complicity in torture: 
[T]he use of torture by a state is dishonourable, corrupting 
and degrading the State which uses it and the legal system 
which accepts it. . . . 
The prohibition on state torture under this Convention and in 
customary international law . . . is now established as a per-
emptory norm or a rule of jus cogens, from which derogation 
by states through treaties or rules of customary law not pos-
sessing the same status is not permitted. . . . 
Although there may be a debate as to the use of information 
obtained through torture or cruel, inhuman and degrading 
treatment in averting serious and imminent threats to na-
                                                                                                             
 294. Munaf, 553 U.S. at 702 (quoting Omar v. Harvey, 479 F.3d 1, 20 & n.6 
(2007) (dissent)). 
 295. R (Mohamed) v. Sec’y of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, 
[2008] EWHC (Admin) 2048, [2009] 1 W.L.R. 2579 (Eng.). Binyam (or Bin-
yan) Mohamed was an Ethiopian citizen and U.K. resident who had been 
arrested in Pakistan on suspicion of involvement in terrorist activities. Id. ¶¶  
7–14. He alleged that following his arrest, he was tortured in both Afghani-
stan and Morocco at the behest of the U.S. military. Id. ¶¶ 26–37. British 
intelligence officers were alleged to have been complicit in Mohammed’s de-
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with questions for him to answer. Id. ¶ 87. 
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tional security, it is a principle at the heart of our systems of 
justice that evidence of involuntary confessions obtained by 
such means are inadmissible at a trial.296 
In Binyam, the court relied on R v. Horseferry Road Magis-
trates Court ex p Bennett297 to declare the international charac-
ter of certain basic tenets of the rule of law: 
Whatever differences there may be between the legal systems 
of South Africa, the United States, New Zealand and this 
country, many of the basic principles to which they seek to 
give effect stem from common roots. There is . . . no principle 
more basic to any proper system of law than the maintenance 
of the rule of law itself. When it is shown that the law en-
forcement agency responsible for bringing a prosecution has 
only been enabled to do so by participating in violations of in-
ternational law and of the laws of another state in order to se-
cure the presence of the accused within the territorial juris-
diction of the court . . . respect for the rule of law demands 
that the court take cognisance of that circumstance. To hold 
that the court may turn a blind eye to executive lawlessness 
beyond the frontiers of its own jurisdiction is . . . an insular 
and unacceptable view.298 
The court is clearly making an evaluative judgment about 
norms that transcend its own jurisdiction. It is then using that 
judgment to make a finding about the conduct of its own gov-
ernment. The language used is highly shame-based as shown 
by the use of words like “abhorrence.” 
Other recent cases involving rendition have also required 
U.K. courts to use shaming language. In Regina (Bancoult) v. 
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (No. 
2),299 the House of Lords noted: 
There are allegations, which the US authorities have denied, 
that Diego Garcia or a ship in the waters around it have been 
used as a prison in which suspects have been tortured. The 
idea that such conduct on British territory, touching the hon-
                                                                                                             
 296. Id. at [142], [147]. 
 297. R v. Horseferry Road Magistrates Court, Ex parte Bennett, [1994] 1 
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our of the United Kingdom, could be legitimated by executive 
fiat, is not something which I would find acceptable.300 
Lord Bingham consulted foreign case law and IL norms in A 
(FC) and Others (FC) v. Secretary of State for the Home De-
partment, A and Others, (FC) and Others v. Secretary of State 
for the Home Department (Conjoined Appeals),301 opining that 
[t]here can be few issues on which international legal opinion 
is more clear than on the condemnation of torture. Offenders 
have been recognised as the “common enemies of mankind” 
(Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky 612 F. Supp. 544 (1985), 566, Lord 
Cooke of Thorndon has described the right not to be subjected 
to inhuman treatment as a “right inherent in the concept of 
civilisation” (Higgs v. Minister of National Security [2000] 2 
AC 228, 260), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has de-
scribed the right to be free from torture as “fundamental and 
universal” (Siderman de Blake v. Argentina 965 F. 2d 699 
(1992), 717) and the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture (Mr 
Peter Koojimans) has said that “If ever a phenomenon was 
outlawed unreservedly and unequivocally it is torture” (Re-
port of the Special Rapporteur on Torture, E/CN.4/1986/15, 
para 3).302 
Lord Bingham also detailed the type of legal authority that 
might be persuasive—implicitly supporting the idea of a sham-
ing reference group comprised of a network of courts applying 
similar processes and norms: 
The authorities relied on by . . . Lord Hope . . . and Lord 
Rodger . . . to support their conclusion are of questionable 
value at most. In El Motassadeq, a decision of the Higher Re-
gional Court of Hamburg of 14 June 2005, the United States 
Department of Justice supplied the German court, for purpos-
es of a terrorist trial proceeding in Germany with reference to 
the events of 11 September 2001, with summaries of state-
ments made by three Arab men. There was material suggest-
ing that the statements had been obtained by torture, and the 
                                                                                                             
 300. Id. at [35]. 
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221. 
 302. Id. at [33]. The Special Rapporteur also cited Article 41 of the Interna-
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German court sought information on the whereabouts of the 
witnesses and the circumstances of their examination. The 
whereabouts of two of the witnesses had been kept secret for 
several years, but it was believed the American authorities 
had access to them. The American authorities supplied no in-
formation, and said they were not in a position to give any in-
dications as to the circumstances of the examination of these 
persons. Two American witnesses who attended to give evi-
dence took the same position. One might have supposed that 
the summaries would, without more, have been excluded. But 
the German court, although noting that it was the United 
States, whose agents were accused of torture, which was 
denying information to the court, proceeded to examine the 
summaries and found it possible to infer from internal evi-
dence that torture had not been used. This is not a precedent 
which I would wish to follow.303 
Lord Bingham seems to be saying that in order to determine if 
state behavior is shameful, not all foreign judicial findings are 
alike. It is only findings made by a court in the shaming refer-
ence group that follows similar norms that are persuasive. In 
his opinion, Lord Hoffman, who agreed with Lord Bingham, 
said this case was of “great importance . . . for the reputation of 
English law,”304 again establishing the notion of a network of 
domestic courts as a shaming reference group by implying that 
English courts and English law would only enjoy a good repu-
tation if IL norms were properly applied. 
A recent case brought by surviving Mau Mau fighters against 
the British Government is also likely to offer key insights on 
shaming by domestic courts.305 The case stems from allegations 
that torture and severe forms of physical and sexual abuse 
were systematically perpetrated against Mau Mau rebels and 
their supporters in the 1950s.306 The British government ini-
tially took the stance that Kenya, and not Britain, was liable 
                                                                                                             
 303. Id. at [60]. 
 304. Id. at [99]. 
 305. The case has been subject to two preliminary judgments: the first con-
cerning whether Kenya or the United Kingdom is the appropriate defendant, 
Mutua v. Foreign & Commonwealth Office, [2011] EWHC 1913, [2], and the 
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 306. Mutua, [2011] EWHC 1913 at [1]. 
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for the Mau Mau claims as the successor state to the colonial 
administration in Kenya.307 The Kenyan government strongly 
objected to this argument, stating that it 
[did] not accept liability for the torture of Kenyans by the 
British colonial regime. In no way can the Kenyan Republic 
inherit the criminal acts and excesses of the British colony 
and then the British Government. . . . Kenya fully supports 
this case . . . [and] calls on the British Government to lessen 
the costs of litigation by simply admitting liability.308 
The Kenyan position has been supported by activists who 
have deployed shaming language against the British defense: 
Archbishop Desmond Tutu and Sir Nigel Rodley, the British 
member of the UN Human Rights Committee . . . sent an 
open letter to the British Foreign Secretary, David Miliband 
in which they state[d that] . . . this [attempt to pass liability 
to Kenya] represents an intolerable abdication of responsibil-
ity. Britain’s insistence that international human rights 
standards should be respected by governments around the 
world will sound increasingly hollow if the door is shut in the 
face of these known victims of British torture.309 
In the High Court, at the preliminary stage, Justice 
McCombe said, “[I]f the allegations are true (and no doubt has 
been cast upon them by any evidence before the court), the 
treatment of these claimants was utterly appalling.” 310  He 
found that “[t]he evidence shows that those new materials [re-
ferring to British documents revealing practices of torture] 
were removed from Kenya upon independence precisely be-
cause of their potential to embarrass the UK Government.”311 
The court also quoted from a preceding judgment: 
That word honour, the deep note which Blackstone strikes 
twice in one sentence, is what underlies the legal technicali-
ties of this appeal. The use of torture is dishonourable. It cor-
rupts and degrades the state which uses it and the legal sys-
tem which accepts it. When judicial torture was routine all 
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over Europe, its rejection by the common law was a source of 
national pride and the admiration of enlightened foreign 
writers such as Voltaire and Beccaria. In our own century, 
many people in the United States, heirs to that common law 
tradition, have felt their country dishonoured by its use of tor-
ture outside the jurisdiction and its practice of extra-legal 
“rendition” of subjects to countries where they would be tor-
tured.312 
Further, “the rejection of torture by the common law has a spe-
cial iconic importance as the touchstone of a humane and civi-
lised legal system.”313 
Justice McCombe was unstinting in his employment of sham-
ing in the case before him: 
[I]t may well be thought strange, or perhaps even “dishonour-
able”, that a legal system which will not in any circumstances 
admit into its proceedings evidence obtained by torture 
should yet refuse to entertain a claim against the Govern-
ment in its own jurisdiction for that government’s allegedly 
negligent failure to prevent torture which it had the means to 
prevent, on the basis of a supposed absence of a duty of 
care.314 
Justice McCombe also recognized that the U.K. had a duty to 
refrain from torture under Article 14 of the U.N. Convention 
against Torture. While noting that this convention had entered 
into force many years after the events in question had oc-
curred, McCombe nonetheless considered it “an echo of princi-
ples” long recognized under IL, particularly those in the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights, which was in force from 
1950.315 
In this case, the British Government eventually responded 
positively to these shaming efforts. Instead of appealing Justice 
McCombe’s second decision in the matter (in which he had re-
jected the U.K.’s argument that the passage of time precluded 
the feasibility of a full trial)316 as it initially declared its plans 
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to be,317 the government agreed to pay £19.9 million in compen-
sation to 5,228 surviving victims and pledged to support the 
construction of a memorial in Nairobi to the victims.318 Moreo-
ver, while sidestepping a direct apology, the government has 
itself adopted shaming language to describe the incidents 
which took place. Foreign Secretary William Hague stated that 
“[t]he British government sincerely regrets that these abuses 
took place and that they marred Kenya’s progress towards in-
dependence. Torture and ill-treatment are abhorrent violations 
of human dignity that we unreservedly condemn.”319 The Mau 
Mau Veterans Association welcomed this statement as “a be-
ginning of reconciliation.”320 
3. Canada 
Shaming by domestic courts in reliance upon foreign and IL 
sources is not only an Anglo-American phenomenon. The Ca-
nadian Supreme Court decision in Suresh v. Canada321 shows 
similar techniques being employed. Suresh was a fundraiser for 
the Tamil Tigers and had originally been granted refugee sta-
tus in Canada.322 The court held that Suresh was entitled to a 
fair procedure: “[W]e find that . . . Suresh made a prima facie 
case showing a substantial risk of torture if deported to Sri 
Lanka, and that his hearing did not provide the procedural 
safeguards required to protect his right not to be expelled to a 
risk of torture or death.”323 According to the court, 
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[t]he inquiry into the principles of fundamental justice is in-
formed not only by Canadian experience and jurisprudence, 
but also by international law, including jus cogens. This takes 
into account Canada’s international obligations and values as 
expressed in “[t]he various sources of international human 
rights law—declarations, covenants, conventions, judicial and 
quasi-judicial decisions of international tribunals, [and] cus-
tomary norms.”324 
The court was not willing to defer to the executive branch 
and allow it to transfer Suresh to a foreign state: 
[T]he guarantee of fundamental justice applies even to depri-
vations of life, liberty or security effected by actors other than 
our government, if there is a sufficient causal connection be-
tween our government’s participation and the deprivation ul-
timately effected. We reaffirm that principle here. At least 
where Canada’s participation is a necessary precondition for 
the deprivation and where the deprivation is an entirely fore-
seeable consequence of Canada’s participation, the govern-
ment does not avoid the guarantee of fundamental justice 
merely because the deprivation in question would be effected 
by someone else’s hand.325 
The court refused to accept the fig leaf of Canada’s involuntary 
participation in torture: 
[W]e cannot pretend that Canada is merely a passive partici-
pant. That is not to say, of course, that any action by Canada 
that results in a person being tortured or put to death would 
violate s. 7. There is always the question . . . of whether there 
is a sufficient connection between Canada’s action and the 
deprivation of life, liberty, or security.326 
In Suresh, the Canadian Supreme Court employed a familiar 
device to bring IL norms home: 
International treaty norms are not, strictly speaking, binding 
in Canada unless they have been incorporated into Canadian 
law by enactment. However, in seeking the meaning of the 
Canadian Constitution, the courts may be informed by inter-
national law. Our concern is not with Canada’s international 
obligations qua obligations; rather, our concern is with the 
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principles of fundamental justice. We look to international 
law as evidence of these principles and not as controlling in 
itself.327 
The court concluded that “international law rejects deportation 
to torture, even where national security interests are at stake” 
and that this norm “best informs the content of the principles 
of fundamental justice under s. 7 of the Charter.”328 In reaching 
this conclusion it drew upon treaty instruments and the com-
plete lack of support for torture at the international level as 
evidenced in the absence of administrative procedures sanc-
tioning torture, statements by states, and scholarly work.329 
Suresh is a particularly interesting example of shaming be-
cause the court implicitly recognizes the notion of a shaming 
reference group by making distinctions between states based 
on their human rights records and the relative weight that 
should be given to promises made by public officials: 
[i]n evaluating assurances by a foreign government, the Min-
ister may also wish to take into account the human rights 
record of the government giving the assurances, the govern-
ment’s record in complying with its assurances, and the ca-
pacity of the government to fulfill the assurances, particularly 
where there is doubt about the government’s ability to control 
its security forces.330 
This idea finds resonance in the case of AS and DD (Libya) v. 
Secretary of State for the Home Department,331 where the court 
cited the European Court of Human Right’s (“ECtHR”) insist-
ence that diplomatic assurances be closely examined, ultimate-
ly finding that it was acceptable for the U.K. to reject such as-
surances offered by Libya on the grounds that Gaddafi and his 
government did not enjoy a track record of reliability.332 
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4. Germany333 
In German legal thought, the idea of shame is somewhat dif-
ferent than that held in the Anglo-Saxon common law tradi-
tion. In Germany, it is often thought that to break the law is in 
itself tantamount to having acted shamefully. To accuse some-
one of breaking the law, to find them guilty of breaking the 
law, or to remind them of an occasion where they broke the law 
would in many instances be equivalent to causing that person 
to experience some level of shame (depending on the severity of 
the breach). There is thus virtually no need to characterize un-
lawful behavior as shameful—it is already shameful by virtue 
of being unlawful. 
Nonetheless, a strong example of what could be considered 
“additional” shaming is provided by the unlikely source of the 
German Federal Administrative Court (“BVerwG”) in its judg-
ment of June 21, 2005.334 The decision of the United States and 
U.K. to proceed with the second Iraq War without a Security 
Council resolution, thus rendering such a war illegal under IL, 
was one that mystified and offended many Germans.335 The 
court’s decision was reflective of this attitude. 
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The case concerned a German military officer who refused to 
work on an IT project in the army on the grounds that complet-
ing the project would further military operations in Iraq, some-
thing that would have conflicted with his conscience as the war 
was, in his opinion, an illegal act of aggression (Angriff-
skrieg).336 The IT project in question involved an overhaul of 
the German army’s software systems in order to allow for bet-
ter integration within NATO, and to facilitate better inter-
operational capabilities with the armed forces of other nations, 
specifically the United States and other EU states, on multina-
tional missions.337 The officer’s concerns arose, inter alia, from 
the fact that Germany permitted American and British planes 
overflight rights during the second Iraq War, allowed them to 
use facilities within Germany (including substantial foreign-
operated army bases), and dispatched German warplanes to 
monitor Turkish airspace.338 
At the time of the officer’s refusal, the war in Iraq had just 
commenced.339 However, it was foreseeable that the war could 
continue for many years and the completed IT project would 
make all of the aforementioned tasks easier.340 Throughout the 
process, the position of the German army was based partly on 
the stance that the officer’s assessment of the legal situation 
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that the war in Iraq was an illegal act of aggression was incor-
rect, and/or that the work he had been assigned would not di-
rectly or indirectly aid the war.341 It is noteworthy that, even in 
this phase, several other army personnel took a sympathetic 
view of the officer’s disruptive behavior,342 including both his 
refusal to work on the project343 and appearing at his work-
place dressed as a civilian with a white rose affixed to his cloth-
ing.344 
Eventually, the on-site legal advisor applied to the Ministry 
of Defense for an official opinion on the legality of the war, 
which was duly delivered.345 The ministry’s paper did not ex-
plicitly state that the war was illegal, but stated that Germany 
“rejected” military action against Iraq and “regretted” that 
Iraq’s disarmament was not being pursued peacefully.346 The 
paper further stated that Germany would not participate in the 
war, but that it would maintain its duties under NATO, which 
included those actions which the officer complained of.347 Under 
these circumstances, the officer could not reconcile his work in 
the army with his conscience and thus refused to obey his or-
ders concerning the IT integration until the German Constitu-
tional Court decided on the matter.348 The soldier was then 
transferred to another project while the army’s disciplinary 
lawyer commenced proceedings against him.349 Again, a certain 
leniency toward the soldier in question would seem apparent in 
that the official state prosecutors asked the military lawyers to 
set aside the case on the grounds that due to the media atten-
tion the possible illegality of the war in Iraq had received, the 
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soldier could not be faulted for having reached the conclusions 
that he did.350 This plea, however, was unsuccessful.351 
In the ensuing disciplinary process, the soldier appealed to 
the BVerwG on the grounds that he was obeying his con-
science, which is constitutionally protected by Article 4(1) of 
the German Basic Law, and that he had the right to be as-
signed work that did not require him to disobey his con-
science.352 Despite the fact that it is an administrative court, 
not normally seized of constitutional or international matters, 
the BVerwG showed itself not only willing to entertain the sol-
dier’s conscience argument, but also showed an intense interest 
in the question of whether the war in Iraq was illegal, as Ger-
man soldiers are not required to obey orders that are contrary 
to international law.353 
Of the BVerwG’s 126-page decision, twenty-one pages dealt 
exclusively with the legality of the Iraq War and Germany’s 
participation in it. In its treatment of the issue, the court man-
aged to rake over numerous facts, which were potentially em-
barrassing to the United States. Inter alia, the court reiterated 
the ICJ interpretation of the prohibition on the use of force 
used in its Nicaragua decision (a decision which went against 
the United States)354 and discussed the failed attempts to se-
cure a new resolution against Iraq at the Security Council,355 
before remarking that the content of the resolution depended 
on what was included in the final text. This implied that what-
ever the United States representatives “thought” S.C. Resolu-
tion 1441 allowed them to do was irrelevant.356 The court also 
quoted an interview given by Paul Wolfowicz, former President 
of the World Bank, in the magazine Vanity Fair. In the inter-
view, Wolfowicz said that the weapons of mass destruction 
(“WMD”) case for war against Iraq had been invented for public 
consumption (as all sectors of the population recognized taking 
control of these WMD as a legitimate military objective) and 
because it would allow the U.S. administration to overcome 
“bureaucratic resistance” to the war, before recalling that U.N. 
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General-Secretary Kofi Annan had labeled the war “an illegal 
act.”357 
The court found that there were “serious misgivings under 
international law about the legality of the war,”358 described 
U.S. and U.K. actions as “offensive, military battle actions,”359 
and stated that “any state that uses force contrary to the U.N.-
Charter is breaking military law and committing an act of ag-
gression.”360 The court added a considerable edge to its criti-
cism by pointing out that under the laws of neutrality, Germa-
ny may have had the affirmative duty to intern United States 
and British soldiers found on its territory in order to prevent 
them from participating in the war.361 Despite its extensive re-
search into the legality of the war, the court did not check 
whether the IT project in question was contributing to the war 
efforts; they decided that it was sufficient that the soldier in 
question had understandable reasons for fearing that it 
might.362 
 Having thoroughly delegitimized U.S. and U.K. actions, 
the court proceeded to criticize German complicity. In its 
strongest critique of the German government, the court stated 
that when the soldier joined the army (approximately thirty 
years prior), he could not have been expected to prepare him-
self for the possibility that a German government, constitu-
tionally bound to observe the principles of law and justice, 
would ever decide to take supportive military action in favor of 
the United States and its allies in a war that was questionable 
under IL.363 The statement clearly implies that a serious dete-
rioration in ethical and legal standards had occurred. 
The court also made repeated references to the fact that deci-
sions of conscience, such as the one under examination, were 
oriented on the categories of “good and evil.”364 While this is an 
oft-repeated formula when examining cases involving freedom 
of conscience, the court was unflinching in the use of this lan-
guage, which made clear that “good” and “evil” were at stake. 
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The court’s strong language in condemning the actions in Iraq 
was matched only by its congratulatory words for the soldier 
concerned. The latter part of the judgment dripped praise for 
the soldier, at one point extolling his “courage” in explaining 
his disagreement with the war to his colleagues,365 and at oth-
ers praising his serious and thoughtful conduct throughout the 
investigation.366 
Perhaps most interestingly of all, the court specifically ad-
mitted that the fact that the soldier was influenced by religious 
as well as legal considerations did not harm his case, because 
the idea “in a democratic rule of law State, that a necessary 
connection between law and morality exists or should exist, is 
at least understandable.”367 
Despite the use of strong shaming language, the judgment 
was seen by some as an exercise in judicial restraint, attribut-
able to the court not wanting to open up unintended conse-
quences with regards to the constitutionality of German sup-
portive actions or the potential criminal liability of government 
officials from what had started as such a limited question 
(freedom of conscience).368 However, the court technically only 
needed to determine whether there was enough legal uncer-
tainty that an officer could be placed into a state of needing to 
exercise his own conscience on the matter.369 That the court al-
so considered whether the war on Iraq was illegal has been 
viewed by some as a possible warning to the German govern-
ment “to prevent similar actions from happening in the fu-
ture.”370 
The authors agree with this assessment. The sympathetic 
treatment the soldier received from many (although not all) of 
his superiors, the court’s unstinting praise, as well as the fact 
that the court was composed of three judges and two military 
officers acting as volunteer judges (a mechanism often used in 
Germany when the question at hand demands particular ex-
pertise in an area), all point to a German establishment deeply 
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unhappy with the government’s supportive role in the war and 
willing to make a strong statement, demonstrating in the pro-
cess the shame experienced as a result of the nation’s complici-
ty in the war. 
Any shaming of the United States and U.K. was likely nei-
ther per se intended nor avoided. The court’s attitude primarily 
seems to have been that it was merely applying the law; it 
could hardly be faulted for reiterating facts that were entirely 
true or for reiterating basic axioms of international law, re-
gardless of the embarrassment caused. While the Court en-
gaged in considerable use of shame-oriented reasoning, the 
true “master shamer” in this particular process was the Ger-
man soldier who managed to bring the full light of the court 
system to bear on the German government’s covert military 
support for a war that contravened IL, simply by refusing to 
work on a software project. 
B. Other Domestic Adjudication 
Agencies other than courts may also enforce IL rules at the 
domestic level, and may employ shaming as a component of 
this enforcement. Commissions of inquiry are commonly used 
in this context. Consider the example of the Arar Inquiry. This 
inquiry arose out of the arrest of Maher Arar, a Syrian-born 
Canadian.371 In 2002, on his way back to Canada from a vaca-
tion in Tunisia, Arar was stopped at JFK airport in New York 
City and arrested by U.S. officials who had been informed by 
the Canadian federal police that he was a terrorist.372 Arar was 
transported to Syria, where he was held in custody for nearly a 
year.373 He was held in deplorable conditions and beaten for the 
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first few weeks of his imprisonment.374 Unable to withstand 
this treatment, Arar made false confessions.375 
Arar’s plight gained attention from influential Canadians 
even before his release.376 As a result, his eventual return to 
Canada was accompanied by a media outcry and the Canadian 
government set up an inquiry headed by Judge Dennis 
O’Connor.377 This inquiry concluded that “[t]he RCMP provided 
American authorities with information about Mr. Arar that 
was inaccurate, portrayed him in an unfairly negative fashion 
and overstated his importance .”378 Further, 
[s]ome Canadian officials did operate under the ‘working as-
sumption’ that Mr. Arar had been tortured. . . . [A]ll Canadian 
officials dealing with Mr. Arar . . . should have proceeded on 
the assumption that he had been tortured during the initial 
stages of his imprisonment and . . . that the “statement” he 
had made to the SMI had been the product of that torture.379 
Judge O’Connor’s inquiry also resulted in a number of rec-
ommendations for government agencies involved in anti-
terrorism work. Recommendation 12 is salient: “[w]here Cana-
dian agencies become aware that foreign agencies have made 
improper use of information provided by a Canadian agency, a 
formal objection should be made to the foreign agency and the 
foreign minister of the recipient country.”380 Recommendation 
13 further requires the Department of Foreign Affairs to pro-
vide country reports about human rights practices to the rele-
vant agencies,381 and Recommendation 14 requires the agencies 
to review their practices with regard to sharing information 
with countries “with questionable human rights records.” 382 
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Specifically, directions are required for “eliminating any possi-
ble Canadian complicity in torture, avoiding the risk of other 
human rights abuses and ensuring accountability.”383 The in-
quiry also recommended that Canada “register a formal objec-
tion with the governments of the United States and Syria con-
cerning their treatment of Mr. Arar.”384 
Following the publication of this report, the Canadian gov-
ernment issued a formal apology to Arar and awarded him 
CDN$10.5 million in compensation.385 Arar’s case was taken up 
by Amnesty International with a major campaign386 and, de-
spite the U.S. government’s refusal to acknowledge any wrong-
doing,387 several members of the U.S. Congress made individu-
al apologies to Mr. Arar in 2007.388 
III. THE SHAMING REFERENCE GROUP 
The preceding discussion about the internal and external di-
mensions of shame and criticisms about procedural fairness 
and partisanship all point to the importance of actors with 
whom the offender feels a sense of community as a necessary 
condition for the effectiveness of shaming.389 We call this the 
shaming reference group. An offender is only likely to experi-
ence shame if it suffers a loss of reputation relative to its 
standing within its shaming reference group. This group need 
not be static: it could include national 390  and international 
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courts, international and intergovernmental organizations, na-
tion states and their leaders, international NGOs, and domes-
tic constituencies of the relevant state. 
The authors’ notion of the shaming reference group is built 
upon insights from the psychology scholarship about the im-
portance of “affective connection” with external actors who 
might observe the event. As Tangney and Miller note, “alt-
hough shame is no more ‘public’ than guilt in terms of the ac-
tual structure of the eliciting situation, when feeling shame, 
people’s awareness of others’ reactions may be somewhat 
heightened.”391 This means that a properly identified shaming 
reference group has potency for the enforcement of IL norms 
via shaming. Some examples of shaming reference groups are 
provided below. 
A. The European Union 
The EU serves as a shaming reference group for both struc-
tural and historical reasons. Structurally, EU treaties express-
ly create inter-linkages and transnational accountability insti-
tutions that require member states to be responsive to sham-
ing.392 For example, U.K. courts are better able to resist execu-
tive pressure to deport terror suspects because of the existence 
of the ECHR.   
Consider the case of Saadi v. Italy.393 In 2002, Nassim Saadi 
was arrested in Italy and placed in detention for several years 
while proceedings, in which he stood accused of several crimes 
including international terrorism, took place.394 The case under 
Italian law proved complex and after approximately four years 
of proceedings, Saadi was released from detention.395 However, 
                                                                                                             
Whatever differences there may be between the legal systems of 
South Africa, the United States, New Zealand and this country, 
many of the basic principles to which they seek to give effect stem 
from common roots. There is, I think, no principle more basic to any 
proper system of law than the maintenance of the rule of law itself. 
Id. 
 391. Tangney et al., supra note 9, at 1261. 
 392. See, e.g., European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, E.T.S. No. 5 (Nov. 4, 1950). 
 393. Saadi v. Italy, App. No. 37201/06, 49 Eur. H.R. Rep. 30 (2008). 
 394. Id. ¶¶ 11–17. 
 395. Id. ¶ 31. 
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during the period of his detention, a Tunisian court had found 
him guilty of terrorism offenses (membership in a terrorist or-
ganization and incitement to terrorism) in absentia and sen-
tenced him to twenty years imprisonment.396 
Following Saadi’s release, Italy desired to deport him to Tu-
nisia.397 Saadi contended that there was a real threat that he 
would be tortured if this course of action were to be implement-
ed.398 Although the Italian courts issued a stay on his deporta-
tion, 399  Saadi also requested a stay from the Strasbourg 
court. 400  The Strasbourg court decided that deporting Saadi 
would breach Article 3 of the European Convention of Human 
Rights, citing its own previous cases, Soering v. UK 401  and 
Chahal v. UK,402 which prohibited deportation when there was 
a real risk of torture or inhumane or degrading treatment to 
the deportee at the proposed destination.403 
The U.K. joined the proceedings in Saadi as a third-party in-
tervener. 404  Both the U.K. and Italy argued that the court 
should amend its doctrine on Article 3 of the convention—
developed in Chahal—to allow deporting states to consider the 
danger the potential deportee posed to the public in balancing 
their own security against their duty to prevent torture under 
the convention.405 The court was not persuaded; it held that a 
person’s conduct is irrelevant to the absolute prohibition con-
tained in Article 3 and that “balancing” security with the like-
lihood of a deportee being tortured was “misconceived”—
declaring these to be two different goods or values which do not 
stand in any relationship to each other that could be “bal-
anced.”406 
                                                                                                             
 396. Id. ¶ 29. 
 397. Id. ¶ 32. 
 398. Id. ¶ 35. 
 399. Id. ¶¶ 41–43. 
 400. Id. ¶¶ 51–52. 
 401. Soering v. United Kingdom, App. No. 14038/88, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. 439 
(1989). 
 402. Chahal v. United Kingdom, 22 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1831 (1996). Chahal was a 
radical Sikh living in the U.K. who was charged with conspiring to murder 
the Prime Minister of India. Id. ¶¶ 19, 23. 
 403. See Saadi, 49 Eur. H.R. Rep. ¶¶ 124–49. 
 404. Id. ¶ 7. 
 405. See id. ¶¶ 113–16, 122. 
 406. Id. ¶ 139. 
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The case is significant because the U.K. pushed hard to have 
the court acknowledge the existence of a post-9/11 world in 
which it was necessary to drastically re-interpret the conven-
tion’s prohibition on torture. The court also refused to endorse 
the U.K. and Italy’s view that mere diplomatic assurances that 
a suspect would not be tortured sufficed to allow a convention 
state to deport a suspect in good faith.407 The immediate after-
math of the Saadi opinion offers a classic illustration of how 
the shaming reference group works. The U.K. Court of Appeal 
endorsed the Saadi decision at the earliest opportunity in AS 
and DD (Libya) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, 
citing the ECHR’s insistence on close scrutiny of diplomatic as-
surances.408 The court found that it was reasonable to conclude 
that the assurances offered to the U.K. by Libya in AS and DD 
were inadequate as Gaddafi and his government did not enjoy 
a track-record of reliability.409 Due to the ECHR’s interpreta-
tion of Article 3, unlike the courts in Canada and the United 
States, British courts cannot submit to pressure from the exec-
utive to perform a balancing act between security needs and 
the prohibition on torture. 
The shaming reference group can also serve both as a source 
of norms and as a source of monitoring, interpretation, and en-
forcement. For example, in A & Others v. Secretary of State for 
the Home Department,410 an appeal was brought by nine foreign 
nationals who were suspected of involvement in terrorism but 
were not charged with any crime.411 The U.K. had detained 
these individuals at Belmarsh Prison under s. 23 of the Anti-
terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 because they could not 
be deported.412 This provision empowered the government to 
                                                                                                             
 407. See id. ¶ 148. The Court specifically stated that such assurances 
“would not have absolved the Court from the obligation to examine whether 
such assurances provided, in their practical application, a sufficient guaran-
tee that the applicant would be protected against the risk of treatment pro-
hibited by the Convention.” Id. 
 408. AS & DD (Libya) v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2008] EWCA 
(Civ) 289, [68]. 
 409. See id. at [73]. The Court also discussed the precise evidence regarding 
the past and possible future unreliability of the Libyan government. Id. at 
[68]–[82]. 
 410. A v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2004] UKHL 56, [2005] 2 A.C. 
169 (Eng.). 
 411. Id. at [1]–[3]. 
 412. Id. at [2]. 
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detain suspected international terrorists pending deportation, 
despite the fact that removal from the U.K. was temporarily or 
indefinitely prevented in derogation of Article 5 of the Europe-
an Convention on Human Rights.413 The government claimed 
that this was necessary to combat the national security threat 
posed by al-Qaeda terrorists.414 
The House of Lords, by a majority of eight to one, accepted 
that al-Qaeda terrorism represented a serious threat to the life 
of the nation,415 but seven of the eight law lords who accepted 
this premise nevertheless concluded that s. 23 was not strictly 
required by the exigencies of the situation.416 These same judg-
es also concluded that s. 23 was incompatible with Article 14 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights because of the way 
it discriminated between nationals and non-nationals.417 The 
derogation permitting permanent detention of non-nationals 
treated them more harshly than nationals.418 Absent the possi-
bility of deportation, it lost its character as an immigration 
provision and hence constituted unlawful discrimination.419 
In Binyam, the court relied upon domestic norms420 and IL 
norms421 to shame both its own government422 and a key ally—
the United States: 
                                                                                                             
 413. See Chahal v. United Kingdom, 22 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1831, ¶ 10. (1996). 
 414. A v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2004] UKHL 56, [25]. 
 415. Id. at [54]. 
 416. Id. at [44]. 
 417. Id. at [68]. 
 418. Id. 
 419. See id. at 159. 
 420. See supra text accompanying note 296. 
 421. Id. 
 422. The Court referred to torture as being the subject of the “abhorrence,” 
id. at [143], and “revulsion,” id. at [147(v)], of the entire legal system, and of 
“cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment” as being “the subject of interna-
tional . . . stigmatism,” id. at [143]. In addition, the Court stated that when it 
is practiced as part “of state policy it is a particularly ugly phenomenon,” id. 
at [142(i)]. The court also referred to an American judgment, which called 
torturers “the enem[ies] of all mankind,” id. at [142(ii)] (quoting Filartiga v. 
Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980)), as well as a previous judgment 
of the Privy Council which referred to confessions obtained by torture as hav-
ing no place in any “civilised society.” Id. at [147(v)] (quoting Wong Kam-
ming v. R, Lord Hailsham [1980] 1 A.C. 247, 261 (P.C.)). The court added that 
the UK Government facilitated the interrogation of BM for part of 
the period . . . in the knowledge of the reports of the interviews at 
Karachi which contained information relating to his detention and 
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[T]he U.S. Government has refused to provide any infor-
mation as to BM’s location during the period between May 
2002 and May 2004. The fact that no explanation has been 
provided to date (despite the disclosure in the earlier proceed-
ings) is a matter of serious concern in relation to the practical 
operation of the disclosure procedures before the US military 
commissions . . . . 
[T]o leave the issue of disclosure to the processes of the mili-
tary commission . . . would be to deny to BM a real chance of 
providing some support to a limited part of his account and 
other essential assistance to his defence. To deny him this at 
this time would be to deny him the opportunity of timely jus-
tice in respect of the charges against him, a principle dating 
back to at least the time of Magna Carta and which is so basic 
a part of our common law and of democratic values.423 
The language in these cases again rises well beyond the ap-
plication of legal rules to invocations of honor and shame. 
When other courts or institutions in the EU refer to such deci-
sions in their own judgments, the shaming reference group gets 
solidified by an iterative process where norms are refined and 
applied. 
B. Network of Domestic Courts 
Courts, particularly those that share common legal families 
or legal traditions—whether those are the byproduct of coloni-
alism, treaty regimes, or membership in international organi-
zations—are part of epistemological networks. They reference 
and cite each other’s opinions, thereby transplanting foreign 
law and IL norms into their respective domestic legal systems. 
When litigation involves the conduct of a state or regime, these 
courts act as a shaming reference group in several ways. First, 
they observe the application of norms by other courts and note 
this record in their own judgments. Second, and ancillary to 
this recording function, they make evaluative judgments about 
                                                                                                             
treatment and to which we have referred at para 87. It is also signif-
icant that his detention incommunicado was unlawful under the law 
of Pakistan. 
Id. at [147(vi)]. 
 423. Id. at [147(xi–xii)]. The court also said “the unreasoned dismissal by 
the US Government of BM’s allegations as ‘not credible’ as recorded in the 
letter of 22 July 2008 is, in our view, untenable, as it was made after consid-
eration of almost all the material provided to us.” Id. at [147(x)]. 
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the proceedings and decisions of foreign courts in applying IL 
norms. Third, because they are conscious of being subjected to 
similar treatment by other foreign courts, they are likely to be 
constrained by a desire to apply IL norms correctly or, at a 
minimum, explain derogations from such norms in the form of 
plausible legal arguments. 
To be sure, courts are idiosyncratic in selecting the courts to 
which they refer and follow no particular hierarchy in deciding 
which decision is more persuasive when there is a division be-
tween different courts on the issue. This has generated pre-
dictable criticism about activism and partisanship by judges.424 
Critics have called for domestic courts to ignore foreign law in 
resolving domestic disputes, arguing that doing so is an un-
democratic transplantation of foreign values outside of the leg-
islative process.425 In the United States, there have even been 
efforts to pass legislation in order to take away the power of 
courts to refer to foreign law.426 Whether they expressly refer to 
foreign cases in their judgments or not, it is clear that the net-
works and epistemological communities that lawyers and judg-
es share satisfy the conditions necessary for them to constitute 
a shaming reference group. 
The practice of domestic courts on the reference to foreign 
law varies. U.S. courts seem to largely reference international 
law rather than foreign law.427 The courts of Canada often ref-
erence other courts, mainly from the U.K.,428 but on at least one 
occasion it referenced Israel when debating non-refoulement in 
relation to suspected terrorists. 429  Even when these courts 
                                                                                                             
 424. See Kelley Vlahos, Judge Bork: Judicial Activism Is Going Global, FOX 
NEWS (Sept. 11, 2013), http://www.foxnews.com/story/2003/09/11/judge-bork-
judicial-activism-is-going-global/. 
 425. See generally John O. McGinnis, Foreign to Our Constitution, 100 Nw. 
U.L. REV. 303 (2006). 
 426. Kimberly Railey, More States Move to Ban Foreign Law in Courts, USA 
TODAY (Aug. 4, 2013), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/08/04/states-ban-foreign-
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 427. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006); Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
 428. See, e.g., Charkaoui v. Canada (Minister for Citizenship and Immigra-
tion), [2007] 1 S.C.R. 350 (Can.). 
 429. In Suresh, in contemplating the deportation of a member of the Libera-
tion Tamil Tigers of Eelam to Sri Lanka (where he claimed he would, as a 
member of an armed opposition group, face torture at the hands of the gov-
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come to conclusions that are different from the foreign cases 
referred to, the discursive process has shaming implications. 
For example, in recent terrorism cases, Canada and the 
United States rely on Article 3 of the Convention against Tor-
ture (“CAT”), which they seek to interpret in a manner that is 
not conducive to achieving the CAT’s goals. These courts have 
whittled down the CAT’s main purpose by finding that only a 
“risk” of torture is not sufficient to prevent deportation, or that 
other concerns, such as security, need to be taken into consid-
eration when considering deportation to a state in which the 
deportee may be tortured.430 In addition, these courts consider 
whether or not their executives have been able to obtain “dip-
lomatic assurances” that the receiving state will not torture the 
deportee.431 These devices recast the issue as one of “balanc-
ing.” 
In the United States, the issue of non-refoulement was side-
stepped by the Supreme Court, which pointed out that there 
was no likelihood (only a possibility) that the suspects would be 
tortured in the receiving country, but also (similar to Canada) 
that it was for the executive to determine whether there was a 
risk of torture.432 There was no discussion of IL in their find-
ings and the issue of non-refoulement was given quite cursory 
treatment.433 At the same time, the Supreme Court has insist-
ed fully on its jurisdiction regarding Guantanamo Bay, and has 
also made clear that it is its responsibility to ensure that the 
United States is living up to the standards it has set for itself 
                                                                                                             
ernment), the Canadian Supreme Court noted that “the Supreme Court of 
Israel sitting as the High Court of Justice and the House of Lords have re-
jected torture as a legitimate tool to use in combatting terrorism and protect-
ing national security.” Suresh v. Canada (Minister for Citizenship and Immi-
gration), [2002] S.C.R. 3, para. 74 (Can.) (citing H.C. 6536/95; Hat’m Abu 
Zayda v. Israel General Security Service, 38 I.L.M. 1471 (1999)); Sec’y of 
State for the Home Dep’t v. Rehman, [2001] 3 W.L.R. 877, para. 54. 
 430. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, CASES INVOLVING DIPLOMATIC ASSURANCES 
AGAINST TORTURE: DEVELOPMENTS SINCE MAY 2005 3–10, 17–22 (2007), 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/eu0107.pdf. 
 431. Id. 
 432. Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 700–02 (2008). 
 433. See id. at 702 (stating that “[t]he Judiciary is not suited to second-
guess such determinations” in reference to whether or not a deportee is likely 
to be tortured at their destination). 
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and to ensure compliance with obligations of international law 
in that respect.434 
In the Canadian Supreme Court case of Charkaoui,435 the 
court decided that it was not permissible to detain foreign na-
tionals for alleged terrorism-related activities based on non-
disclosed information.436 In doing so, the court also compared 
several Canadian anti-terrorism measures to the British Anti-
Terrorism Act, employing the somewhat circuitous reasoning 
that the British Anti-Terrorism Act had itself been based on 
certain aspects of Canadian law and practice.437 The decision 
also cited a number of foreign court decisions, including Rasul 
v. Bush and Silvenko v. Latvia.438 It seems essential for the 
court to justify its conclusions with numerous references to 
American and English court decisions.439 It is also notable that 
it refers to the European Convention by way of citing British 
decisions and indirectly measures itself by the convention’s 
standards. 440 
                                                                                                             
 434. For example, in Hamdan, the Court examined international law in 
great detail, explicitly refusing to accept the government’s argument that the 
Geneva Conventions did not apply to the “war on terrorism.” See Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 625–35 (2006). 
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 440. The Court devoted several paragraphs of its decision to analyzing the 
British decision A v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, in which 
several breaches of the ECHR were determined before the Court concluded,  
[t]he finding in Re A of breach of the detention norms under the Eu-
ropean Convention on Human Rights was predicated on the U.K. 
Act’s authorization of permanent detention. The IRPA, unlike the 
U.K. legislation under consideration in Re A, does not authorize in-
definite detention and, interpreted as suggested above, provides an 
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U.K. courts take a more eclectic approach to the reference of 
foreign legal authorities. For example, in Abbasi v. Secretary of 
State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs,441 the case con-
cerned a British national who had been captured in Afghani-
stan and held in Guantanamo Bay.442 The litigants sought to 
compel the British government to take all possible steps to re-
lease Abbasi from the “legal blackhole” that was Guantana-
mo.443 The court mentioned the shared legal tradition of the 
United States and U.K. and made numerous references to the 
decisions of the European courts, ultimately concluding that 
Abbasi had no rights under the ECHR or international law to 
diplomatic assistance from the U.K.444 It also stressed that Ab-
basi’s case had been taken up by the Inter-American Commis-
sion and that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office would 
likely be unable to help the matter further than the Commis-
sion would.445 The decision demonstrated a willingness of the 
court to rely on both foreign courts and international bodies to 
ensure that a degree of protection commensurate with its own 
standards would be implemented. 
C. Other International Organizations 
As previously noted, IOs serve as shaming enforcers. They al-
so serve as a shaming reference group. One example is the In-
ter-American Commission on Human Rights. In the context of 
Guantanamo Bay, the Commission has urged the United 
States to clarify the status of the inmates and to conduct inves-
tigations into accusations of treatment that may amount to tor-
ture or other inhumane and degrading treatment, on the 
grounds that the United States is obligated to prevent such 
treatment. 446 Throughout its report, the Commission empha-
                                                                                                             
effective review process that meets the requirements of Canadian 
law.  
Id. paras. 125–27. 
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sized that U.S. action did not suffice to comply on any of the 
contentious points and left no doubt that the fate of the Guan-
tanamo detainees was in no way up to the United States alone 
to decide. The United States categorically denied the allega-
tions of torture, but felt the need to justify this denial by sub-
stantiating its own safeguards in this respect, including nu-
merous ongoing judicial proceedings.447 
CONCLUSION 
States adhere to IL for a variety of reasons, including the 
threat of being shamed. This Article has demonstrated that the 
conceptual work on shaming is applicable to IL and that un-
derstanding the precise architecture for the application of 
shaming enriches our conception of IL. Further, the authors 
proposed a structure for shaming in IL by identifying the rele-
vant targets for shaming, the enforcers of the sanction, and the 
conditions for imposing them. It has been demonstrated that 
enforcement of IL norms affects state behavior in ways similar 
to traditional coercive sanctions and that states invest consid-
erable effort to avoid shaming. 
The analysis showed several examples of states, regimes, and 
individuals being shamed by international organizations and 
by domestic courts in the U.K., United States, Germany, and 
Canada. These courts did not enforce IL as they would normal-
ly enforce domestic law, but rather called upon the state’s 
sense of shame to get the regime to modify its behavior. While 
the record of the courts is patchy and idiosyncratic, recent case 
law indicates a growing willingness to reference IL norms and 
more systematic study is necessary in order to fully understand 
the role of national courts in enforcing IL. In the final part of 
the paper, we developed the notion of a shaming reference 
group, advancing some examples of networks that meet the 
necessary conditions, including supranational organizations 
like the European Union and networks of domestic courts. It is 
hoped that the framework offered will inspire other scholars to 
study shame sanctions in IL in a more exhaustive manner, ex-
panding on our case studies and developing on the acknowl-
edged limitations of partisanship, definition, delegation, and 
dispersion to propose models that advance the understanding 
of how IL is enforced with non-traditional legal sanctions. 
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